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11 INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background of the Study
Central banks are faced with a series of variables in the process of formulating
and implementing monetary policy. This series of variables range from the ultimate
target of policy, at one end, to the instrument of policy, at the other end, with opera-
tional target, intermediate targets, and indicators or information variables in the middle.
At the root of this traditional framework is a fundamental requirement that a predictable
and stable relationship between the instruments along with their intermediate or opera-
tional targets and the ultimate target exists. However, with the increasing liberalization
of economies and globalization of financial markets, this framework has put to test
central banks’ credibility in coming up with a reliable policy framework to achieve its
desired ultimate targets.
In the Philippine setting, the traditional framework of anchoring on monetary
aggregates and thereby effectively using interest rates to achieve its primary objective
of price stability has similarly suffered from serious re-assessment over the past few
years. Behind this re-assessment were two major developments that occurred during the
last twenty years.
One major development includes the various measures undertaken towards lib-
eralization of economy along with the globalization of financial markets that all af-
fected the country’s financial system in several aspects. These were strengthened on 24
August 1992 when Circular No. 1353 was issued by the Central Bank of the Philippines
(CBP) liberalizing foreign exchange regulations throughout the country.1 These reforms
that were introduced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB)
as part of their Structural Adjustment Program in early 1980s and that have led to the
resurgence of capital inflows in the 1990s, have gradually changed the landscape of the
conduct of transactions in the domestic economy, broadened the options for sourcing
liquidity, and introduced new dimensions to the conduct of monetary policy.
                                                
1 Under Circular No. 1353, foreign exchange may be freely sold and purchased outside the banking sys-
tem.  It also allows foreign exchange receipts, acquisitions or earnings to be deposited in foreign cur-
rency accounts, whether in the Philippines or abroad, or brought out of the Philippines.  As regards for-
eign loans and foreign investments that will eventually require servicing with foreign exchange pur-
chased from the Philippine banking system, proceeds of these loans and investments will continue to be
sold  for pesos to the authorized agent banks of the CBP.
2The other major development was what broke out in the East Asian region in
the middle of 1997 that was felt in the Philippines by way of a plunging peso. The do-
mestic currency was relatively stable at P26.30/US$-P26.40/US$ at the beginning of
1997 until 11 July. On 12 July 1997, the Philippine peso was allowed to embrace the
true sentiments of the market, and had depreciated by more than 50 percent at the end
of the year. The rise in interest rates to arrest further depreciation did not help the peso.
Soon after, output growth slowed, unemployment rose, while significant pressure af-
fected the banking system.
On the monetary front, these developments led to shifts in demand for money
and the money multiplier that eventually made monetary targeting a less reliable anchor
for monetary policy as well as transmission mechanism and the signal variables. While
shifts in demand for money have already been seriously assessed during the last few
years, the transmission mechanism and signal variables of monetary policy remains to
be re-visited.
Along these lines, this paper basically argues that an understanding of the
transmission process is necessary to the appropriate design and implementation of
monetary policy. Philippine monetary authorities need to be alert to the impact of
changes in the structure of the economy as these changes tend to alter the economic ef-
fects of a given monetary policy measure. This paper further argues that in particular
there is a need for monetary authorities to be eclectic in monetary policy management.
This requires introducing additional indicator of monetary policy stance aside from the
traditional interest rate to include exchange rate movements. Together, these indicators
may well represent a specific Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) for the Philippines that
could serve as comprehensive measure of domestic monetary conditions in the face of a
more liberalized economy.
1.2. Statement of Research Problem and Working Hypotheses
The main question this paper intends to answer is whether MCI could be a use-
ful short-run indicator of domestic monetary conditions for the Philippines in the face
of a more liberalized economy and globalized financial market.
This research question is guided by the following working hypotheses.
3• First, the MCI provides a useful short-run measure of domestic monetary conditions
in a more open economy. Indicators such as bank lending rate and peso-dollar ex-
change rate are argued to well represent domestic monetary conditions.
• Second, it is also hypothesized that the usefulness of MCI could be gleaned from its
ability to contain information on the likely behavior of an important indicator of
real economic activity, the output gap.
• And third, while MCI provides a useful indicator of domestic monetary conditions,
it is should be used carefully and alongside other indicators of credit growth, other
domestic asset prices such as bonds, stocks and real estate as well as fiscal policy in
monetary management. A comprehensive assessment of the situation would neces-
sarily need to take these issues into account. Only then it would be possible to have
a coherent interpretation of events and firm base for policy decisions.
1.3 Objectives of the Study
The study will generally seek to address the following concerns:
• To provide a working knowledge of the Philippine monetary framework, its objec-
tives, targets (intermediate and operating targets) and instruments as well as the
main issues on monetary policy formulation that could help analyze Philippine
MCI;
• To provide a basic and clear knowledge of the economics behind MCI that could
serve as a theoretical or conceptual framework in the construction of Philippine
MCI;
• To compute a broader measure of domestic monetary conditions for the Philippines
and evaluate its usefulness, likely effects to monetary policy process and to the
overall economy as well as some caveats regarding its use;
• To critically analyze its use and compare it with the experiences of other countries
adopting similar schemes for the purpose of extracting insights and lessons for pol-
icy formulation; and
• To derive policy implications on monetary policy management and propose policy
measures regarding its operation, particularly as to whether the index could indeed
represent domestic monetary conditions.
41.4 Significance of the Study
The attainment of these objectives will certainly benefit Philippine policymak-
ers, in particular the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)2 which is primarily tasked with
provision of among other things policy directions in the areas of money, banking and
credit as well as overseeing and implementing monetary and financial program with the
IMF. Specifically, the proposed MCI along with policy measures suggested in this
study may be considered by the BSP as an alternative framework with the end view of
coming up with an improved and more effective monetary policy strategy.
The study can also be useful to the country’s legislators, particularly the House
of Representatives’ Committee on Bank and Financial Intermediaries, as the analytical
evaluation of the proposed MCI and its likely effects to the overall economy can serve
as valuable inputs in their deliberations. This is in line with the decision of the House of
Representatives last 7 July 19993 to prioritize a measure seeking to amend the General
Banking Act or the Central Bank Act to keep pace with the increasing globalization of
financial markets.
In the international scene, findings and policy implications to monetary formu-
lation will be useful to countries of South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN) which
are continuously seeking for broader measure of domestic monetary conditions.
The study is made doubly significant by the fact that there is no known compre-
hensive study that lays out MCI as broader measure of domestic monetary conditions in
the Philippines, thereby pioneering in lending support or evidence to a lot of theorizing
on the possible or potential consequences of such measure on the macroeconomy. And
this is conducted at a time when it is most needed considering the currentness of the
issues surrounding the MCI that emerged during the last few years.
                                                
2The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) is the central bank of the Republic of the Philippines. The BSP
was established as an independent central monetary authority pursuant to the Philippine Constitution and
the New Central Bank Act of 1993 as part of the restructuring of the old Central Bank of the Philippines
(CBP), which was originally established in 1949. The Act was passed by Congress on 10 June  1993,
approved by President Fidel Ramos on 14 June 1993, and took effect on 3 July 1993 which will enjoy
fiscal and administrative autonomy in the discharge of its mandated responsibilities.
3 Philippine Star, 7 July 1999, at the net, http://www.philstart.com/datedata/7Jul.
51.5 Scope and Delimitation of the Study
The conduct of analysis is limited to the available and consistent data on macro-
economic and monetary indicators from January 1989 to June 1999, a period spanning
126 months. Much of the data contained in the study are generated from secondary
sources, specifically the BSP Statistical Bulletin and Selected Philippine Economic In-
dicators.
As far as the MCI is concerned, the indicators include those that are directly
controlled or are directly affected by BSP’s policy measures. Hence, MCI will not fully
reflect the overall stance of monetary policy. Indicators related to other domestic asset
prices4 as well as fiscal policy will not be dealt with. Furthermore, MCI focuses on de-
mand side management and is assumed to be useful in the short-run, not in the long-
term.
It is also important to note that while MCI would be a useful indicator of do-
mestic monetary conditions, it is also subject to some limitations. There could be a
number of issues (such as political and institutional in nature) that may be relevant for a
particular country at a particular moment in time that are not captured in MCI. While
all these issues make equally fascinating subjects for exploration, they would in them-
selves necessitate comprehensive treatments and qualify as topics for separate research.
These tasks will be left as a challenge to extend the scope covered and improve the
methodology used in this study.
1.6 Research Design and Methodology
This paper is essentially designed to provide a theoretical and empirical basis
for the construction of MCI. For the qualitative part, reference is made to available lit-
erature on the subject while to a sufficient extent, quantitative analysis of secondary
data, mostly statistics based on monthly reports and other selected economic indicators,
is conducted.
The second chapter evaluates the Philippine monetary policy framework from
1986 up until 1999. This chapter highlights the objectives, intermediate and operating
targets and instruments of monetary policy as well as the practice of targeting during
                                                
4 Include bonds, stocks and real estate prices.
6the review period. Implications of the increasing globalization of financial market to
monetary policy framework will also be assessed.
The third chapter deals with the economics behind MCI. The current views on
monetary policy transmission along with its significance to monetary policy process
and overall economy are presented. It also features comparative survey of MCI being
adopted by Canada, New Zealand and Norway and other institutions along with criti-
cisms raised against its use.
The empirical design proceeds first with discussions on the indicators that typi-
cally constitute MCI. The intention of an MCI is to provide some sort of a gauge as to
what influence the stance of monetary policy is having on the economy. MCIs are nor-
mally computed on the basis of the effects on excess demand rather than the inflation.
In part this reflects the fact that MCIs were originally derived using the parameters of a
simple IS-curve.5 Tracing then the effects through to inflation requires a more complete
model.
MCIs are motivated from the standard Keynesian open economy framework
that characterizes the aggregate demand side of the economy as being a function of,
among other things, the real exchange rate and real interest rates. The aggregate supply
part of the economy – the price equation - typically has the price of non-tradeables be-
ing adjusted according to expectations of inflation and an output gap (or unemployment
gap), and prices of tradeables determined by world prices and the exchange rate.6
There are a variety of conceptual ways in which the MCI could be measured. It
could be constructed in terms of the effects of both the interest and exchange rates on
aggregate demand or prices. The original version of MCI is discussed in Freedman
(1995) and explored further in Eika et al (1996). This version of MCI is patterned after
that of Bank of Canada (Boc).
1.         Nature of variables. The MCI can be calculated in real or in nominal
terms. Because of the lag in measuring real effective exchange rate, some uses nominal
variables in constructing MCI. However, Lim (Fund memorandum, unpublished) and
                                                
5 Mayes, D., and M. Viren, “A Monetary Conditions Indicator for the EURO Area,” Bank of Finland,
1998, p. 3.
6 Stevens, G.R., “Pitfalls in the Use of Monetary Conditions Indexes,” Reserve Bank of Australia Bulle-
tin, August 1998, p. 35.
7Gonzalez-Hermosillo and Ito7 argued that for the relatively short term (for which the
MCI is useful), the distinction is less important. Movements to the nominal interest
rates and exchange rates are likely to generate similar movements in their real counter-
parts since the price measures that underlie the real MCI would change more gradually
than would the nominal interest and exchange rates. However, over the long-term, it
would be preferable to use real magnitudes to prevent the trend difference between for-
eign and domestic inflation from dominating the MCI.
2.         Model of Aggregate Demand. The relative weights on the components
of MCI are based on an econometric equation that is motivated from the standard open
macroeconomy model where aggregate demand is a function of among other things in-
terest rates and exchange rates. The model explaining aggregate demand through the
IS-curve can be expressed in the following relationships:8
Y = – αi – βe  +  φG +  δy*     (Equation 1)
where, Y  =   aggregate demand
e   =   real exchange rate
i    =   real domestic interest rate
G  =   domestic government spending
Y* =   foreign economic activity
Equation 1 shows that aggregate demand, which determines the level of domes-
tic economic activity or output of domestic goods, is negatively related to the real ex-
change rate, negatively related to the real domestic interest rate and positively related to
both levels of domestic government spending and economic activity in the countries
overseas with which the domestic economy trades.
3.         Weight of MCI. MCI is a linear combination of domestic interest rate
and the exchange rate, less their values in a base period. Based on equation 1 and fol-
lowing demand pressures approach, the MCI can be written as follows:
                                                
7See Gonzalez-Hermosillo, Brenda and T.  Ito,   “The Bank of Canada’s Monetary Policy Framework:
Have Recent Changes Enhanced Central Bank Credibility?”, IMF Working Paper WP/97/171, December
1997.
8  Equation 1 is  the reduced form of the standard approach to modelling the IS-curve within the IS-LM
framework, that is from a system where,  Y = D + G + T,  where T is trade balance (which is a function
of the exchange rate and foreign economic activity), D is domestic demand (which is a function of the
interest rate) and G is exogenous.
8MCI  =  α (it-ib) + β (et-eb) + 100    (Equation 2)
where, it =   real domestic interest rate at current period
ib =   real domestic interest rate at base period
α =   relative weight of the effects of real domestic
      interest rate changes on Y.
et =   real exchange rate at current period
eb =   real exchange rate at base period
β =   relative weight of the effects of real exchange
                 rate changes on Y.
The parameters α and β in equation 1 determine the weight in the MCI. The key
parameter in MCI is the ratio β/α.
The units of measurement of the MCI being in terms of real exchange rate
changes9 can be defined as follows:
MCI =  (1/β/α) (it-ib) +  (et-eb) + 100    (Equation 3)
Thus, the MCI can be interpreted most simply as the percent change in real ex-
change rate equivalent to the combined change in the real interest and exchange rates
since the base period.10
4.         Base Year. The base year will serve as reference point and reflects some
form of normality of the economy.
5.         Interpretation. While the interpretation of an MCI remains controversial,
it is now widely understood to mean the net effect on aggregate demand of changes in
monetary policy. It does not seek to capture a direct relationship between monetary
conditions and current inflation. The absolute level of the MCI has no real meaning –
there is no absolute sense of “tightness” or “looseness”, only relative to the chosen base
year. Generally, if MCI is climbing, monetary policy is being tightened with respect to
demand pressures. This implies that monetary conditions are tightened by either an in-
crease in the interest rate or an appreciation of the exchange rate. Conversely, if MCI is
declining, monetary policy is being loosened against demand pressures. This suggests
                                                
9Other normalization is also possible like in terms of  real interest rate equivalent.  However, this paper
uses the real exchange rate equivalent as it shows larger relative impact on real GDP compared to real
interest rate.
10See Freedman (1995), p. 75.
9that monetary conditions are being eased by either a decline in the interest rate or a de-
preciation of the exchange rate. Moreover, since the MCI is always measured relative
to a given base period, subtracting the MCI at two points of time gives a measure of the
degree of tightening or easing between those two points.
The fourth chapter presents the construction of real MCI for the Philippines,
some base year and weight simulations, operational considerations for guiding policy,
analysis of estimated MCI and some caveats regarding its use.
The fifth chapter evaluates the usefulness of MCI as broad framework of do-
mestic monetary policy based on the results of the empirical analysis, explores various
policy recommendations, discusses its implications on the issue of monetary manage-
ment while at the same time suggesting areas for improvement and further research.
1.7 Resume’ of Related Research and Professional Literature
The rapidly growing literature on transmission mechanisms of monetary policy
presented evolution from the traditional interest rate channels to exchange rates
(Freedman, 1996)11 and (Freedman, 1995)12 and then to the so called credit channels
(BIS Policy Paper,1997)13 and (Mishkin, 1996)14. What these stories tell us is that cer-
tainly these mechanisms pose implications for how central banks might best conduct
monetary policy. And while there is debate over the existence of a separate “credit”
channel, attention is oftentimes focused on two basic channels – the interest and ex-
change rates.
Although there has been a proliferation of readings on the subject of MCI which
happen to be fairly recent, these merely describe or discuss the mechanics of MCI in
developed countries such as Canada, New Zealand, Norway and other European coun-
tries.  For the individual  country profiles of MCI, the  best sources for the  description
                                                
11 See Freedman, Charles, “ The Use of Indicators and of the Monetary Conditions Index in Canada,”
1996, at the net,  http://www.bank-banque-canada.ca/english/res/herm-98.htm.
12 See Freedman, Charles, “The Role of Monetary Conditions and the Monetary Conditions Index in the
Conduct of Policy,”  Bank of Canada Review (Autumn), 1995.
13 See Bank for International Settlements, “The Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy in
Emerging Market Economies, Policy Paper No. 3, January 1998, at the net,
http://www.bis.org/publ/plcy03.htm.
14 See Mishkin, Frederic, S., “The Channels of Monetary Transmission:  Lessons for Monetary Policy,”
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper No. 5464, February 1996.
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are those of BoC,15 and Reserve Bank of New Zealand.16 17 Descriptions of other coun-
tries adopting MCI such as Norway18 or have calculated MCI such as Australia, coun-
tries under the Monetary Union (EMU) and Thailand are found in the IMF19 and Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) publications20, work-
ing papers,21 journals22, bulletins23 and international conference materials.24 A survey
of related professional literature critically reviews the current Philippine monetary pol-
icy framework. The IMF Mission Team,25 Stone26, Houben27 and BSP-Department of
Economic Research (BSP-DER)28 all indicate that financial infusion29, an offshoot of
successful macroeconomic stabilization, 30 greatly complicates policy by bringing
money demand growth to levels far above that explained by standard macroeconomic
                                                
15 See Freedman (1996) and Freedman (1995).
16 See Nadal-De Simone F., R. Dennis, P. Redward, “A Monetary Conditions Index for New Zealand,”
Reserve Bank of New Zealand Discussion Paper Series G96/2, July 1996.
17 See Dennis, Richard, “A Measure of Monetary Conditions,” Reserve Bank of New Zealand Discus-
sion Paper Series G97/1, January 1997.
18 Eika, Kari, Neil Ericsson, Ragnar Nymoen, “Hazards in Implementing A  Monetary Conditions In-
dex,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance Discussion Paper No.
568, October 1996.
19 IMF World Economic Outlook, May 1996.
20 OECD Economic Outlook, June 1996.
21 See Mayes, D., and M. Viren, “A Monetary Conditions Indicator for the EURO Area,” Bank of Fin-
land, 1998.
22 See Peeters, Marga, “Measuring Monetary Conditions in Europe: Use and Limitations of the MCI,”
De Economist (Quarterly Review of the Royal Netherlands Economic Association), Volume 147, No. 2,
June 1999, pp. 183-203.
23 See Stevens (1998).
24 See Hataiseree, Rungsun, “Monetary Conditions and Monetary Policy in Small Open Economies:
Empirical Results for Thailand Under Floating Exchange Rate Regime,”  paper presented during the In-
ternational Conference on A Macroeconomic Core of An Open Economy for Progressive Industrializa-
tion and Development in Asia in the New Millennium,   Bangkok, Thailand, 16-18 December 1998.
25 See IMF Background Paper on the Philippines,  Staff Country Report No. 95/114,  November 1995.
26 Stone, Mark, “Financial Infusion and Exiting from a Money Rule,” IMF Working Paper WP/98/31,
March 1998.
27 See Houben, Aerdt, “Exchange Rate Policy and Monetary Policy Strategy Options in the Philippines –
The Search for Stability and Sustainability,”  IMF Paper on Policy Analysis and Assessment PPAA/97/4,
May 1997.
28 BSP-DER Memorandum to the Monetary Board, “On Expanding the Measure of Liquidity,” Unpub-
lished, 17 January 1997.
29 Stone defines financial infusion as an episode of large, upward, and permanent shifts in money de-
mand  prompted by successful macroeconomic stabilization.
30 Surges in money demand can also be triggered by rapid financial reform and lifting of financial re-
forms. See Tseng and Corker, “Financial Liberalization, Money Demand and Monetary Policy in Asian
Countries,” IMF Occasional Paper No. 84, July 1991.
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indicators. This therefore suggests that the current monetary policy framework need
some rethinking in the face of more liberal economy and globalized financial markets.
 As far as the chapter on the Philippine MCI is concerned, the major reference
used in describing the MCI are BSP Annual Reports, IMF Memorandum,31 and a re-
lated paper on globalization and its impact on the Philippines.32
2 THE FRAMEWORK IN THE CONDUCT OF MONETARY POLICY 
AND THE PHILIPPINE POLICY FRAMEWORK
Over the past six years, liquidity and credit in the Philippines have surged to
significant levels. This significant increase could be traced to notable capital inflows
that came in with the liberalization of the economy in early 1990s. Generally, capital
inflows are to be welcomed as they expand a country’s access to real resources and de-
pending on their form and how they are used can stimulate growth and economic de-
velopment.33
However, the spill-over effects of “Tequila crisis” in 1995 and the currency cri-
sis in the second half of 1997 that have hit the Philippine economy clearly proved that
along with various important benefits, capital inflows bring with them painful risks.
Even if inflows (short-term capital inflows) have been used “well”, they can be
abruptly reversed, imposing substantial costs to the economy. And huge inflows, re-
gardless of their long-term impact, could complicate macroeconomic management in
the immediate term.
On the monetary front, these changes in the landscape of financial environment
entailed significant implications for the short-run stability of the demand for money, the
money multiplier, the transmission mechanism and the signal variables. The Philippine
monetary authorities were not spared from these complications as they pose implica-
tions on the transmission mechanism in one end and to the overall objectives of price
stability and sustained growth on the other end. This indicates that a modified approach
                                                
31 Lim, Cheng Hoon, “Philippines: Monetary Conditions Index,”  Unpublished IMF Memorandum, 29
April 1998.
32Valdepeñas, Vicente Jr.,  “Globalization of Capital and Philippine Conditions,”  paper presented  at the
7th National Convention on Statistics, Shangrila-la EDSA Plaza Hotel, Manila, Philippines, 2-4 Decem-
ber 1998.
33 See Fischer, Stanley, “Capital Account Liberalization and the Role of the IMF,”  paper presented at
the seminar, Asia and the IMF, Hong Kong, China, 19 September 1997.
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in the design and implementation of monetary policy is needed since relying on just a
single intermediate monetary indicator may no longer suffice.
This chapter focuses on framework in the conduct of monetary policy from a
general perspective. Next it sets out the role of different variables in the Philippine
policy framework along with its objectives, intermediate and operating targets and in-
struments of monetary policy, further explaining the practice of targeting in the Philip-
pines and finally enumerating the challenges faced by monetary authorities in the face
of increasing globalized finance.
2.1 A Framework For Conduct of Monetary Policy
During the past few years, the role of monetary policy as a tool to promote sus-
tainable growth and inflation in the economy has been recognized compared to fiscal
policy. Mishkin (1996) argues that fiscal policy has lost its appropriateness as a tool to
stabilize the aggregate economy because of some doubts about the ability to time fiscal
policy actions to obtain desirable stabilization outcomes as well as concerns about
budget deficit. The resulting strategy is to leave stabilization of output and inflation to
monetary policy. Monetary policy refers to actions of the Central Bank or Monetary
Authorities (MA) aimed at helping achieve macroeconomic goals and is exercised by
influencing financial factors such as the quantity of money and the level of interest
rates.
Countries undertaking adjustment programs usually suffer from a broad range
of economic problems. In a monetary economy, excessive growth in the money supply
leads to high rates of spending on domestic or foreign goods. Given that domestic sup-
ply is essentially inflexible in the short-run, the former is likely to result in substantial
inflationary pressures in the economy. To the extent that spending pressures are di-
rected towards foreign goods, balance of payments pressures will ensue. Therefore, the
task of monetary policy is to ensure that monetary policies are supportive of the liquid-
ity requirements of growth while constraining the rate of inflation to the minimum level
possible.
Figure 1 shows how central banks typically make use of a set of variables that
play different roles in the conduct of monetary policy. For central banks to achieve the
goals of monetary policy, it must be able to operate through variables which are di-
rectly under its control, called instruments, since goals are not directly controllable. But
13
rather than establishing a direct relationship between instruments and objectives, inter-
mediate targets, operational targets and indicators or information variables are often
considered.
An intermediate target is a variable that is closely linked to the ultimate target or
goal of monetary policy and is influenced by changes in policy instruments. Freedman
(1995) enumerated potential examples of intermediate target as monetary aggregate or
credit aggregate, the exchange rate, and the rate of growth of nominal Gross Domestic
Product (GDP).
The conduct of monetary policy is also influenced by operational target. Most
central banks use short-term interest rate as an operational target. An operational target
is different from intermediate target on several grounds. First, an operational target as-
sumes that transmission mechanism to the ultimate target is faster than an intermediate
target. For instance, the effect of changes in short-term interest rate is assumed to be
faster compared with an intermediate target of say a monetary aggregate which tends to
be spread out over a much longer period of time. The second distinction has something
to do with the nature of the targets. The intermediate target is typically a nominal vari-
able that could serve as an anchor to the system whereas an operational target could not
serve as an anchor since it is directly controlled by the central bank. The third factor
deals with the extent of control over this target. Central banks typically has operating
target to be under its immediate control over intermediate target. Fourth, since opera-
tional target is directly under the control of the central bank the time lags over which it
can decide is shorter than intermediate target. And fifth, the monetary policy sequenc-
ing starts with the operational variable to intermediate and finally to the ultimate target.
However, Freedman (1995) argues that while a central bank need an ultimate
target and instrument, it need not have an intermediate or operational target in the con-
duct of monetary policy. Many countries like the United States have conducted mone-
tary policy without an intermediate or an operational target. The link between the ulti-
mate target and instrument rests on an indicator or information variable. This variable is
assumed to provide some form of a leading or contemporaneous information about po-
tential movements in the ultimate target but is normally not treated as a variable that
could be controlled. An example is a certain interest rate spread or the spread between
short-term and long-term rate that is assumed to contain information about future
movements in real output growth.
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2.2 The Philippine Monetary Policy Framework
2.2.1 BSP’s Ultimate Target
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7653 or the New Central Bank Act provides that
the primary objective of the BSP is to maintain price stability conducive to a balanced
and sustainable growth of the economy. The BSP is also tasked to promote and main-
tain monetary stability and the convertibility of the Philippine peso. In this connection,
the BSP formulates and implements monetary policies to support the objective of price
stability.
The BSP’s framework for conducting monetary policy is based on the interplay
of a set of policy variables, as follows: (1) the ultimate policy objective; (2) instruments
of monetary policy; and (3) operating and intermediate targets. The interplay of these
variables is seen in Figure 2 (The Philippine Monetary Policy Framework).
2.2.2 Instruments of Monetary Policy
To attain price stability, the actual movements of monetary aggregates (domes-
tic liquidity or M3, base money or BM and reserve money or RM) must be maintained
within program targets. Operationally, monetary targeting in the Philippines is under-
taken through the use of various monetary policy instruments. Open market operations
(OMO) as monetary tool involves the sale or purchase of securities by the BSP to with-
draw or inject liquidity into the system in accordance with its primary objective of
achieving price stability. BSP’s open market instruments include lending and borrow-
ing under the reverse repurchase facility, BSP bills, notes, bonds and holdings of
Treasury securities. BSP’s outstanding OMO as of end-May 1999 reached P79.4 billion
(Table 1). Another instrument is reserve requirement which refers to a specific propor-
tion of banks’ deposit liabilities that must be held as reserves with the BSP. From a
high of 25 percent in December 1990, commercial banks’ total reserve requirement
dropped to 12 percent in July 1999 (Table 2). Rediscounting is also a monetary tool that
pertains to the process whereby BSP extends loans to banking institutions on a short-
term basis against eligible papers of their borrowers. As of May 1999, BSP’s outstand-
ing regular rediscount amounted to P5.1 billion at an interest rate of 9.2 percent (Chart
1). The BSP may also use moral suasion. This refers to an intangible, yet persuasive
power exercised by the BSP to influence the behavior of banks and the public towards
the achievement of specific goals of monetary policy. This is utilized by the BSP under
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conditions when it is felt that the existing market mechanisms can not adequately and
promptly ensure the attainment of monetary targets and objectives.
The use of National Government (NG) deposits with BSP as monetary man-
agement tool involves an arrangement between proceeds of securities issued in the form
of Treasury bills and Treasury Notes. Such deposits are placed in a fixed-term deposit
account at prevailing market rates with the BSP. Coordination between monetary and
fiscal authorities becomes critical when an unexpected revenue shortfall or surge in ex-
penditures occur and the NG deems it necessary to withdraw from its cash balances
with the BSP. As of end-May 1999, NG’s deposit balances with the BSP amounted to
P104.9 billion (Table 1).
2.2.3 Intermediate and Operating Targets
The BSP uses variables that stand between the ultimate target and policy in-
struments. It uses M3 as an intermediate target. Targeting M3 is anchored on a stable
and predictable relationship between money, inflation and income. M3 is the sum of
money in circulation and deposit liabilities of deposit money banks (DMBs) which in-
clude demand, savings, time deposits and deposit substitutes, excluding foreign cur-
rency deposits and NG deposits with the BSP.
The operating targets of the BSP are BM and RM. These were chosen as oper-
ating targets because of the degree of control exercised by the BSP over these variables,
the availability of timely data on these variables and the direct link between these vari-
ables and M3.
RM is defined as the sum of currency in circulation and reserves of DMBs with
the BSP. BM is defined as RM plus reserve-eligible government securities (REGS),
reserves in the form of market-yielding Treasury bills and if there is any, reserve defi-
ciency of DMBs. Through the control of these operating variables, the BSP indirectly
influences the behavior of M3.
2.3 The Practice of Targeting in the Philippines, 1986-1999
2.3.1 Monetary Targeting
How the authorities formulate monetary policy stems from an understanding of
monetary programming in the Philippines (Figure 3). Theoretically, monetary policy
affects the price level through the Fisher equation, MV=PY, where M is money supply,
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V is the income velocity of money and PY is nominal income or real income multiplied
by the price level. Through this relationship, changes in money supply eventually feeds
into changes in the general price level.
Using this framework, the BSP takes into account output growth and inflation
targets, as set by economic planning authorities, and then using given velocities, sets
about achieving the monetary targets appropriate to the income and price objectives.
BM and M3 are directly linked through the money multiplier. The link of both
variables through the money multiplier summarizes the money creation process, which
is relevant in understanding how monetary policy works. The money creation process
starts with the printing and issuance of currency by the BSP. This enters into the finan-
cial system as cash holdings of banks or the general public. Part of the holdings of the
general public are deposited with banks. Banks, after setting aside a portion for reserve
requirements, lends out or invests the remaining deposits of the public along with part
of their own cash holdings. These funds eventually find their way back to the banking
system as deposits and the process continues. Through this mechanism, the contrac-
tion/expansion in M3 becomes a multiple of the contraction/expansion in BM.
Factors affecting base money are then projected. Major accounts such as net
foreign assets (NFA) and net domestic assets (NDA) are targeted. The monetary
authorities’ net foreign assets account is based on the projected receipts and disburse-
ment projections consistent with the balance of payments projections. NDA is projected
based on the movements of NG deposit balances with the BSP, rediscounting budget,
and BSP Net Income Position. BSP’s open market operations are then derived.
Following the debt crisis in 1983 and the subsequent move to a floating ex-
change rate regime in October 1984, the monetary policy framework has been anchored
on monetary aggregates with the end view to achieve lasting price stability and sustain-
able growth. This framework essentially requires a steady and predictable relationship
between money and inflation. However, evidence shows that this relationship has bro-
ken down.
First, the rise in M3 in 1993 until 1995 has not fed into higher inflation (Chart
2). Funded mainly by significant pick up in credit extended by the monetary system, the
relatively high year-on-year growth in M3 of more than 40 percent during the early part
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of the 1995 failed to ignite significant surge in prices after eight to twelve months.34
Though there were some fluctuations in price movements during the early part of 1996,
partly reflecting spill-over effects of supply side developments, including the allevia-
tion of power shortages and favorable harvests during 1994, and rising food prices from
a drought during 1995, inflation rate dropped significantly to 5.2 percent at the end of
1996 and further down to 4.2 percent in May 1997.
Even simple scatter diagrams indicate that the relationship between M3 and in-
flation has changed. Figures 4a to 4c show the scatter plot of inflation rate and M3
growth along with the regression curve obtained by regressing the inflation rate on M3
growth (lagged by eight and twelve months) from January 1986 to May 1999. Scatter
plots are further divided into two periods to include pre-liberalization period (January
1986 to December 1993) and post-liberalization period (January 1994 to May 1999).
Figure 4b shows that prior to liberalization of the economy, higher M3 growth appears
to accompany the rise in prices. However, Figure 4c suggests that this relationship has
changed as the rise in M3 growth fails to show significant pick up in inflation rate. This
is seen in a somewhat flatter regression curve compared to Figure 4b. What these scat-
ter plots reveal is that the absence of a pickup in inflation from relatively high rates of
liquidity growth marks a break in the past.
Second, detailed regression analysis confirms a breakdown in the relationship
between money and inflation. This breakdown in money demand is supported by re-
sults of tests of the stability of the demand for money by the IMF Mission Team 199535,
                                                
34 According to regression estimates by the BSP-DER, most of the feedthrough from liquidity growth to
inflation occurs within eight to twelve months.
35 The standard money demand relationships leave  unexplained a large portion of the level of liquidity
since early 1994 as shown by the behavior of the residual or the error term.  The error term fluctuated
widely during the volatile mid-1980s, was generally negative during the late 1980s and turned positive
during the early 1990s.  In 1995, the error correction term has been positive and consistently large rela-
tive to history.  These results were derived using a two-step approach and runs from first quarter 1981
and second quarter 1995.  See IMF Background Paper on the Philippines,  Staff Country Report No.
95/114, November 1995,  pp. 30-33.
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Stone (1995)36 37 and unpublished BSP-Department of Economic Research Memoran-
dum (1997).38 The three studies point to the effects of globalization as one of the driv-
ing forces behind this breakdown. This could be seen in Chart 3. Indicators of moneti-
zation include ratios of M3 and NDA of the monetary system to nominal GNP. Starting
1992, increasing liquidity mismatch has been shown as M3/GNP ratio behaved more
modest than NDA/GNP, implying that most of the credit expansion was financed by net
foreign monetary liabilities as seen by the significant upclimb from December 1993 to
June 1997 (Chart 4).
2.3.2 Modified Monetary Targeting
Beginning the second half of 1995, it was felt that the effectiveness of monetary
policy could be enhanced by complementing monetary aggregate targeting with some
form of inflation targeting.
The monetary authorities modified their monetary policy approach placing
greater emphasis on the price objective and less weight on the intermediate monetary
target. The approach essentially allows BM targets to be adjusted upwards by the
amount that international reserves exceed expected levels, as long as inflation stays
within a targeted range. Broadly, this appears to be a prudent response to the new chal-
lenges posed by globalization by reducing the risk of reaching policy decisions based
on projections using a weakened relationship between money and inflation.
                                                
36 Stone uses two simple demand money functions based on quarterly data from the first quarter of 1984
through the fourth quarter of 1993 (first demand function)  and extended to fourth quarter of 1996 (sec-
ond demand function) and includes independent variables such as broad money, consumer price index,
real GNP and 91-day Treasury bill rate.   The first demand function produces reasonable parameter esti-
mates and a stationary residual while the second demand no longer produced useful  estimates. See
Stone, Mark, “Financial Infusion and Exiting from A Money Rule,”  IMF Working Paper No. WP/98/31,
March 1998, pp. 12-15.
37 See Debelle, G., Lim, C.,  “Preliminary Considerations of an Inflation Targeting Framework for the
Philippines,”  IMF Working Paper No. WP/98/39,  March 1998, p. 7 and Appendix 1.
38 The long-run demand for money was estimated for second quarter 1986 to third quarter 1996 using a
single-equation regression model with the log of real demand for money  as the dependent variable and
the logs of real GDP, CPI and the 91-day Treasury bill rate as explanatory variables.  In addition, a
dummy variable for 1993 was included to capture the impact of financial liberalization on the demand for
money.  Results showed that the coefficient of said dummy variable was positive and significant at the
10 percent level, suggesting that there was a structural break in the aggregate demand for money (an up-
ward shift) during the period. See BSP-DER Memorandum to the Monetary Board, “On Expanding the
Measure of Liquidity,” Unpublished, 17 January 1997, p. 2 and Technical Appendix.
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2.4 Implications to Present Monetary Policy Framework
What then could be gleaned from these changes? One key lesson is that broadly
the integration of capital markets implies that monetary conditions in a given country
can be affected quite substantially by developments elsewhere.39 On a more substantive
point, developments in monetary front showed that links between money supply and
the ultimate objectives have been obscured, because the economic recovery has been
accompanied by large shifts in money demand. These results show that the effects of
globalization can greatly complicate policy by bringing money demand growth to lev-
els far above that could be explained by standard macroeconomic indicators. This
would mean that adherence to the traditional monetary aggregate targeting would result
in a stance that is either too tight or too loose. Or the use of a strict monetary growth
rule to attain macroeconomic stability may hang on too long to a rigid policy in the face
of a sudden increase in money demand, and thereby, choke off growth by forcing up
real interest rates. Alternatively, the BSP may overestimate the magnitude and duration
of the upward shift in money demand, and modify monetary policy in a way that results
in higher inflation or worse, in a loss of credibility.
But even the modified monetary targeting offers serious challenges given that
inflation reacts to liquidity growth with variables lags. This would certainly entail un-
certainty about the appropriate path of policy instruments consistent with a given infla-
tion target. And this is even more dangerous if lags are long and therefore the danger
that a prolonged and costly tightening would be needed to stem the impact of the excess
liquidity growth on inflation.
These uncertainties suggest that monetary policy cannot be conducted in some
sort of mechanistic way. But neither should one go for the other extreme and conclude
that it is almost impossible to carry out a coherent policy in the face of all these uncer-
tainties. These risks can be addressed by utilizing indicators other than prices that could
serve as early warning signals of impending inflationary pressures. In practice, mone-
tary authorities could monitor carefully the evolution of the exchange rate, domestic
                                                
39 Larsen, Flemming, "Global Economic and Financial Developments in the 1990s and Implication for
Monetary Policy," speech delivered  before the 27th Economics Conference (Possibilities and Limitations
of Monetary Policy), Oesterreichische Nationalbank, 10-11 June 1999, Vienna, p. 4, at the net,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeche/1999/061199.HTM.
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interest rates, credit, international reserves – all of which will provide clues as to the
adequacy of domestic monetary policy stance.
3 THE ECONOMICS BEHIND MONETARY CONDITIONS INDEX
Up until the 1980s, monetary conditions were viewed on the basis of a single or
narrow range of indicators. The BSP in particular uses M3 as indicator of domestic
monetary policy stance (Figure 5). But with a more open economy, Chapter II indicates
that monetary authorities could monitor carefully the evolution of the exchange rate,
domestic interest rates, credit, international reserves that could be potential indicators
of broader domestic monetary conditions. To qualify as broader measure of domestic
monetary conditions, such an indicator must expressly include among others key vari-
ables such as interest rate and the exchange rate which the traditional monetary policy
framework left out in its explicit formulation. In addition, it must take into account the
increasing liberalization of economies and globalization of financial markets whose
pace has virtually altered the landscape of monetary policy formulation.
Over the past few years, Monetary Conditions Indexes (MCIs) have become
popular in several countries as a way of talking about the stance of monetary policy in
the face of a more open economy. Since the BoC began publishing its MCI (Freedman
1995) other central banks have followed. Both Sweden and Norway now publish MCIs.
The IMF, in its World Economic Outlook (May 1996) published MCIs for Italy, Ger-
many, France, the United Kingdom, Japan and the United States. The Reserve Bank of
New Zealand (1996) published a bulletin article illustrating three MCIs for New Zea-
land economy and a paper estimating a New Zealand’s MCI ratio (Nadal-De Simone,
Dennis, and Redward (1996). Recently, Peeters (1999), Mayes and Viren (1998, Bank
of Finland) and Hataiseree (1998, Bank of Thailand) made separate papers on how
monetary conditions could be measured in Europe and Thailand.
While there are criticisms raised against the MCI (in particular in getting
weights of both the interest and exchange rates), these are mainly confined in the tech-
nical level and could not in any way help explain the changing nature of monetary pol-
icy transmission.
This chapter provides the economics behind MCI and its significance to the
monetary policy process and on the overall economy. This chapter ends with compara-
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tive survey of how MCI is calculated and used in monetary policy formulation by other
countries as well as main criticisms advanced against its use.
3.1 Current Views of Monetary Policy Transmission Process
3.1.1From Monetary Actions to Different Channels to Aggregate Demand
Economists and central bankers currently recognize four main monetary trans-
mission paths in more liberalized economy: the interest rate, other domestic asset prices
(bonds, equities and real estate), exchange rate and credit.
The most traditional channel of interest rate influence spending through a num-
ber of channels – the cost of capital, the incentive to save rather than to spend and the
effects on wealth and cash flow. The main components of demand that are affected are
housing, consumer spending on durables, business investment in fixed capital and in-
ventory investment.40 41 The extent of the response of spending depends partly on how
long the changed level of interest rates is expected to persist. The framework that in-
volves the cost of capital works the following way: an expansionary monetary policy
leads to a fall in real interest rates which lowers the cost of capital, causing a rise in in-
vestment spending (including housing) or purchases of durable goods, therefore leads
to an increase in aggregate demand and a rise in output.
In this framework, the rise in interest rate leads to a reduction in the present
value of durable goods and thus decreases demand. Conversely, a lower interest rate
increases the present value of such goods and thus increases demand. Implicit in this
framework is the mechanism that spending that is sensitive to interest rate changes is
affected by changes in the marginal cost of borrowing.
Furthermore, changes in interest rates also lead to changes in average rates on
outstanding contracts and in turn increase over time as old contracts are renegotiated.
Changes in interest rate also affect other types of rates such as deposit rate that could
consequently change the average deposit rate. These changes in average deposit rate
will affect the income and cash  flow of borrowers and lenders that  could have large im
                                                
40 Duguay, Pierre, “Empirical Evidence on the Strength of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism in
Canada:  An Aggregate Approach,”  Bank of Canada, 1996, p. 89, at the net, http://www.bank-banque-
canada.ca/english/res/herm-98.htm
41 Thiessen, Gordon G., “Uncertainty and the Transmission of Monetary Policy in Canada,”  Bank of
Canda, 1996,  p. 10, at the net, http://www.bank-banque-canada.ca/english/res/herm-98.htm
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pact on aggregate demand.
Changes in the interest rate channel also affect the level of other domestic asset
prices. When monetary policy lowers return to holding money by lowering interest
rates, demand for other assets increases. Among these other asset prices include bonds
issued by firms to finance their investment projects. As demand for bonds increases
(raising the price and lowering the return), firms realize that more of their investment
projects have positive net present value, and they issue more bonds in order to finance
them. This causes investment and output to increase.42 Moreover, in the case of equity
and real estate, a rise in real interest rates increases the cost of capital and reduces the
demand for real assets. This lowers production and sales of these assets and at the same
time lowers their value. This is turn causes investment and output to decrease.
For economies with thin and undeveloped capital market, an important price in
the economy is the exchange rate. This way in which the exchange rate affects demand
is also relatively straightforward. The channel works in the following way - an expan-
sionary monetary policy leads to a fall in real interest rates leads to depreciation of the
domestic currency. This channel also involves interest rate effects because when do-
mestic real interest rates declines, domestic currency deposits become less attractive to
deposits denominated in foreign currencies (other than domestic currency), leading to a
fall in the value of domestic currency deposits relative to other currency deposits, that
is, a depreciation of the domestic currency. The lower value of the domestic currency
makes domestic goods cheaper than foreign goods, thereby causing a rise in net exports
and hence in aggregate output. Conversely, a tight monetary policy increases interest
rate, raises demand for domestic assets, and hence lead to appreciation of the exchange
rate. This appreciation tends to reduce the demand for domestic goods which become
more expensive to foreign goods, and thus aggregate demand. Of course, these mecha-
nisms do not take place overnight. And the magnitude of their impacts on aggregate
demand depend on whether the markets expect the change in the exchange rate to be
transitory or long lasting.
Changes in the exchange rate could also exert significant impact on households’
and firms’ balance sheet especially when they hold foreign currency debt either directly
                                                
42 Chami, Ralph, T. Cosimano, C. Fullenkamp,  “The Stock Market Channel of Monetary Policy,”  IMF
Working  Paper No. WP/99/22, February 1999,  p. 4.
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contracted abroad or intermediated through the banking system. Changes in exchange
rate could therefore affect net worth and debt-to-asset ratios that could lead to signifi-
cant adjustments to spending and borrowing unless these debts are fully offset by for-
eign currency assets. This is seen where domestic residents of a particular country are
net debtors to the rest of the world. A significant appreciation of the exchange rate may
lead to an improved balance sheet position of residents that may result to large expan-
sion of domestic demand. This form of balance-sheet effects would tend to offset the
relative price effects.43
Furthermore, in a conference among senior central bankers in January 1998, it
has been noted that the exchange rate appears to be an important channel for small open
economies as it affects not only aggregate demand but also aggregate supply. A loos-
ening of monetary policy leads to depreciation of the exchange rate, increase domestic
producer prices even in the absence of any expansion of aggregate demand. This in turn
may change wages and prices even before movements in import costs have worked
their way through the cost structure.
The first three channels reflect transmission mechanism from the instruments
directly under the control of central banks (such as short-term interest rates or reserve
requirement) to those variables that most directly affect conditions in the non-financial
sector such as asset prices and the exchange rate. The fourth channel of the monetary
policy transmission indicates the link between financial conditions and the spending
decisions of households and firms. It is argued that some countries have either poorly
developed or tightly controlled financial systems where interest rates may not move to
clear the market. In this case, aggregate demand could be influenced more by quantity
rather than the price of credit. The latest version of credit channel involves the com-
mercial-lending aspect that affects the abilities of firms to borrow. Commercial lending
further comprises two features. One feature is the creditworthiness of borrowers. This
mechanism stems from changes in interest rate that affect net worth of firms, thus cred-
itworthiness, by altering values of assets, liabilities and other interest-sensitive cash
flows. An increase in the quantity of money, for instance, improves the balance sheet of
firms by reducing interest rates, enabling them to borrow and invest more. The other
feature of commercial lending is the existence of “bank dependent” borrowers, usually
                                                
43 In some instances,  balance-sheet effects may even dominate relative price effects.
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smaller firms which depend on banks’ credit line to meet their financing needs. This
therefore indicates that the availability of credit extended by commercial banks is re-
lated to the stance of monetary policy. If the central bank mops up money supply by
reducing the quantity of reserves, banks reduce their lending to the public, affecting
those firms which depend heavily on bank for financing. In this case, a contraction
among bank-dependent businesses is assumed to affect aggregate demand and output.
3.1.2 From Aggregate Demand to Inflation
The final link in the transmission process is from movements in aggregate de-
mand to the rate of inflation. Changes in these channels that influence the demand for
goods and services in the economy eventually determines the rate of inflation. These
linkages particularly support the notion that a temporary tightening in monetary condi-
tions would produce a transitory decline below trend in real output and a permanent
reduction in the rate of inflation, thereby resulting in a permanent reduction in nominal
interest rates.44
3.1.3 Shocks
However, the world is a more uncertain and unpredictable place than this brief
description of the linkages from these channels to the aggregate demand and inflation
would imply. Both aggregate demand and prices are in practice frequently subject to
shocks. Demand shocks can be external or domestic in origin. There are also supply
shocks which typically affect prices directly. Such shocks will make demand and prices
more uncertain, and they can also make it very difficult to estimate how much pressure
aggregate demand is putting on the rate of inflation. In these circumstances, central
bank actions have to be directed to coping with disorderliness in markets.
In particular, the open economy predicts that the interest and exchange rates,
when it is under flexible exchange rate, apart from being transmission mechanisms, can
also change as a result of exogenous shocks thereby exerting shocks to the economy. A
tight monetary stance pushes up interest rate, thus reduces domestic spending. But this
increase in the interest rate will similarly rev up domestic and foreign demand for do-
mestic financial assets. The inflow of capital leads to the exchange rate appreciation
                                                
44 Duguay, p.1.
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that could reduce demand for exports and income-competing goods and increase im-
ports, thereby reducing real spending. This appreciation of the exchange rate may also
lead to balance sheet effects. If a country is a net debtor, this appreciation eases debt
burden that may result to the expansion of domestic demand. If the asset effects are not
too strong the interest rate and the exchange rate could move in the same direction,
thus, reducing domestic spending pressures. Conversely, if the asset effects are strong,
these rates could move in opposite direction, hence, the net result could be ambigu-
ous.45
The central bank’s immediate task then is to calm markets. Once the markets
calm down, the central bank will be able to focus attention on the underlying economic
situation, which typically lost to view during the turmoil.
3.2 The Transmission Channels Behind MCI: The Interest Rate and Exchange
Rate
For a small open economy like the Philippines, the choice of the more effective
channels in bringing about changes to economic activity is clearly a matter of judg-
ment. The Philippines tends to recognize the two more important prices in the economy
– the interest rate and the exchange rate. This brings us back to how macroeconomic
variables would work in a small open economy like the Philippines. What is clear from
Figure 5 is that while interest rate channel could represent domestic monetary condi-
tions consistent with price and growth objectives, BSP’s monetary actions can also be
directed at an external objective (the exchange rate) consistent with a manageable bal-
ance of payments (BOP) position as the economy opens up. Together, these two chan-
nels are argued to well represent domestic monetary conditions.
The capital market (which comprises stock exchanges and other institutions
where securities are bought and sold) creates an avenue for some firms, governments,
and countries to finance spending in excess of their current incomes. It also enables
them to lend to other savings they cannot employ as profitably themselves. However,
many developing countries find the lack of an efficiently organized capital market a
serious obstacle to the efficient use of their savings, and thus their overall economic
                                                
45Jansen, Karel, “Thailand, Financial Crisis and Monetary Policy,” Institute of Social Studies, October
1999, p. 16.
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development. In a report that provides an in-depth examination of Philippine capital
market, a major finding reveals that the bond market is shallow and lacks liquidity
which means that there are few investors, very few classes and types of securities. At
the same time the market is dominated by government securities and there is lack of
variety in private bond issues. In a similar vein, it is argued that stock market continues
to be thin and suffers from insider trading and price manipulation.46 Overall, these
findings suggest that the capital market as channel in bringing about changes in eco-
nomic activity in the Philippines could be argued to be slim.
The credit channel creates an avenue for small firms for financing as it is expen-
sive for them to issue securities in the capital markets.47 With this feature of credit
channel, several studies have proved that bank lending responds to stance of monetary
policy.48 However, the importance of this channel has been ascertained to have declined
during the last few years. Recent studies reveal that financial and capital account liber-
alization and the resulting significant surge in alternatives to bank loans have dimin-
ished the link between the real economy and bank-lending channel, thereby reducing
the importance of credit as channel of monetary transmission. These reforms paved the
way for financing through non-banks (finance companies and investment houses) that
offer low-cost financing alternatives than commercial banks and that are funded largely
by foreign borrowings. Increases in foreign borrowings are generalized outcome of
capital inflows. Another point is what has been observed during the past few years that
most deposits have been freed from the legal reserve requirement, thereby weakening
the link between monetary policy and banks’ ability to lend.
These findings could possibly explain the change in the relationship between
monetary aggregates and inflation that was noted when the Philippine economy em-
braced the liberalization reforms. Since the BSP can no longer effectively control
monetary aggregates, the BSP  immediately shifted  to interest rate  policy to  rein on in
                                                
46 The Philippine Daily Inquirer, 24 October 1999, at the net,
http://www.inquirer.net/issues/oct99/oct24/news/news.
47Bank of Korea,  “Korea’s Experience of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism,”  paper presented at
the BIS conference on the Transmission of Monetary Policy in Emerging Market Economies, Basle,
Switzerland,  January 1998, p.  141.
48 For instance, Bernanke and Binder (1992) described how bank lending falls significantly six to nine
months after an increase in the Fed Funds rate, a pattern that other researchers have verified.  See Chami,
p. 5.
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flationary pressures. In particular, short-term borrowing rates are adjusted upwards
whenever inflation starts to pick up. This policy move suggests that the interest rate ex-
erts a role in gauging monetary conditions and further supports its importance as a vari-
able in MCI.
These findings leave us with the two channels of monetary transmission – the
interest and the exchange rates. However, most developing countries that are under the
IMF stabilization program use these policy rates as instruments to arrest payments im-
balances. In particular, tight monetary stance lowers aggregate demand, curbs inflation
and improves balance of payments while expansionary monetary stance works con-
versely.49 However, this analysis has been challenged by Neostructuralists associated
with Lance Taylor. The Neostructuralists argue that devaluation and credit restraint as
chief instruments of policy may have contractionary effects in the short-run. In par-
ticular, the Neostructuralists argue that devaluation is also an expenditure reducing
mechanism with stagflationary consequences for developing countries. This is in con-
trast with the Neoclassicals view that devaluation is chiefly an expenditure-switching
instrument and is assumed to have a stimulative effect on the traded goods. Further to
this argument, the Neostructuralists believe that developing countries have characteris-
tics that reinforce the negative aspects of devaluation on the demand side. On the sup-
ply side, a devaluation raises the prices of essential imports and raises costs. As regards
monetary restraint, the Neostructuralists further argue that because financial markets
are relatively underdeveloped in developing countries credit restraint has both aggre-
gate supply and aggregate demand effects. Most banks in developing countries provide
most of the credit for investment both in inventories as well as in fixed capital. Since
credit comprise the bulk of money from the asset side, credit restraint, by raising the
cost of investment, has a deleterious effect on output in both the short-run and the long
run.
But in the Philippine setting, the contractionary-devaluation analysis is limited.
Developments reveal that there could be some contractionary effects of peso deprecia-
tion in the overall economy in the very short-run that could be attributed to the period
where trade flows are allowed to adjust to relative price changes. This brief period of
adjustment eventually leads to the increase in foreign exchange earnings, improvement
                                                
49Tseng and Corker, p. 23.
28
in net exports, hence, output. This analysis is derived from a phenomenon where for-
eign exchange earnings in response to devaluation follow a J-curve, first declining and
then rising afterwards or where current account worsens initially but as exports respond
and import-substitutes are found, the current account will improve substantially.50 On
balance, therefore, the effects of peso depreciation are argued to have some stimulative
effects on trade and consequently output. On an annual basis, there are three episodes
starting 1986 up until 1999 where significant peso depreciation was noted, both in
nominal and real terms - 1990-1991, 1993 and 1997 (Table 3). All these episodes were
associated with domestic (earthquake and the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo) as well as ex-
ternal shocks (currency crisis). But what is clear is that these periods were accompanied
by improvement in current account balance, BOP position, real growth after a year.
Output growth rose to 1.6 percent in 1992 as current account deficit narrowed to
US$858 million when the peso depreciated in 1990 and 1991. When the peso depreci-
ated again in 1997, current account position recorded a surplus, while real growth re-
mained positive at 0.1 percent. With the continued improvement of current account po-
sition during the first quarter of 1999, real growth rose further to 2.0 percent.
The inclusion of the exchange rate in reviewing domestic monetary conditions
stems from the consensus among central bankers that it is an important price since it
does not only affect aggregate demand but also aggregate supply. In the Philippines, an
important indication of the importance of the exchange rate in the economy is the ratio
of total trade of goods and services to GNP. This ratio was almost stable at around 30
percent during the latter part of the 80s, had steadily risen to almost 40 percent in 1994
and increased further to more than 50 percent in 1997. This indicates that the exchange
rate is clearly the most important price in the economy. In a related vein, export growth
has been sensitive to the real exchange rate changes. In 1989 when the real exchange
rate was appreciating, real export growth fell by an average of 9.5 percent in 1990-1991
(Table 3). From 1998 until the first four months of 1999, exports continued to grow at
an average of 4.9 percent when the real exchange rate depreciated in July 1997. These
indications make the exchange rate important in monetary transmission, hence in the
MCI.
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opment (INT 107), Term I (1998),  Institute of Social Studies,  p. 56.
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Moreover, the open economy predicts that the interest and exchange rates affect
movements of international capital flows. As suggested earlier on, a change in mone-
tary policy shifts the real interest rate and affects directly the interest-sensitive areas of
spending. It also, other things unchanged, moves the exchange rate, because the
changed return available on short-term domestic instruments motivates capital flows
across the border. This therefore indicates that the exchange rate along with interna-
tional capital inflows provide additional transmission channels in an open economy.
The open economy further indicates that in a fixed exchange rate regime, the
monetary authorities are not in full control of money supply as changes in money sup-
ply occur through changes in the BOP.51 This indicates that control over money supply
would require the monetary authorities to sterilize BOP imbalances. However, sterili-
zation becomes a problem if the monetary authorities do not have enough holdings of
securities or foreign exchange reserves, allowing them to control only over that part of
the money supply that is created domestically through credit. Under these circum-
stances, disparities between the supply of and demand for money created by changes in
domestic credit are eliminated through the BOP. The control of money supply is even
more difficult with the presence of capital inflows that prevents domestic interest rates
from deviating significantly from international rates. For instance, a decrease in the
money supply would increase domestic interest rates and attract capital inflows. These
capital inflows would then reverse both the reduction in the money supply and the rise
in interest rates. Domestic prices then would be largely tied to international rates.
However, under a flexible exchange rate regime, control of money supply is
evident, especially when capital is mobile. A monetary restraint puts upward pressure
on domestic interest rate and induces capital inflows. But in contrast to a fixed ex-
change rate regime where these inflows would have offset the effects of restrictive
monetary policies, under the flexible exchange rate regime, the domestic currency
would appreciate in response to the excess supply of foreign exchange. This apprecia-
tion then reinforces the effects of monetary contraction by curbing demand for domes-
tically produced tradable goods and reduces inflationary pressures.
In terms of monetary management, what these stories tell us is that while flexi-
bility of the exchange rate enhances control over domestic monetary conditions in some
                                                
51 Tseng and Corker, p. 24.
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way, it also places other constraints on monetary policy as monetary conditions abroad
become an important concern to domestic monetary authorities especially if the econ-
omy is small. This concern therefore necessitates the need to take the interest and ex-
change rates more into account as important channels through which monetary policy
affects prices and aggregate demand.
3.3 Significance of MCI to Monetary Policy Process and Overall Economy
The significance of an MCI rests on three grounds. First, an MCI provides a
broader assessment of the stance of monetary policy against any demand pressure by
including the effect of changes in the exchange rate on the economy. There are two
main considerations for including the exchange rate in reviewing domestic monetary
conditions. First, under a floating exchange rate regime, monetary policy operates
through two channels, the interest rate and the exchange rate. The interest rate affects
the economy through its effect on savings and investment decisions while the effect of
the exchange rate is transmitted through the demand for locally produced tradable
goods and services and import prices. The extent to which interest rates and the ex-
change rate adjust will depend on developments in foreign interest rates and exchange
rate expectations. Second, when aggregate demand is hit by an exogenous shock to the
exchange rate caused by a loss of confidence in the domestic currency, swift monetary
policy action is required to offset the expansionary effect of depreciation. In the ab-
sence of MCI, there is greater likelihood that monetary authorities may not take timely
actions and monetary conditions might be inappropriately eased until a more complete
assessment of the exchange rate can be made.
Second, an MCI could provide a framework to assess the divergence of actual
monetary conditions from desired monetary conditions, consistent with the objectives
of monetary policy. Since it is difficult for monetary authorities to exactly identify the
types of shocks hitting the economy from day-to-day or week-to-week, it is necessary
to develop a range within which monetary conditions may acceptably move. An as-
sessment can be made of whether actual monetary conditions have deviated sufficiently
from desired conditions (thereby requiring policy action) or whether the desired path
itself had also moved as a result of the shock (thereby not requiring policy action).
And third, MCI gives markets some guide to how they may weigh the relative
importance of the interest rate and exchange rate channels. It is especially useful in
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helping public understand when, as often in the last 12 months and more, interest rates
and the exchange rate are moving in opposite directions.
3.4 Comparative Survey of MCI
This section briefly describes the three most accessible econometric studies in
the construction of MCI – Duguay (1994) for Canada, Nadal De-Simone, Dennis, and
Redwards (1996) for New Zealand, and Jore (1994) for Norway.
The concept of MCI that was introduced by the BoC was based on Duguay’s
(1994) quarterly estimate of output covering the period 1980 up until 1990. Independ-
ent variables include real US GDP, real interest rate (lagged by eight quarters) and real
exchange rate (lagged by 12 quarters). It has estimated both nominal and real MCI, in
which it focuses on the former over the short-term due to lags in the availability of the
price data from Canada’s main trading partners that are used in calculating real effec-
tive exchange rates. Meanwhile, the real MCI is measured as a weighted sum of the
changes in real interest and exchange rates. Based on Duguay’s estimation, the relative
weight in terms of real exchange rate changes (or when normalized using exchange rate
changes) is roughly 1:3, which would mean that a one percent change in the real effec-
tive exchange rate has about the same effect on aggregate demand as a three percentage
point change in the interest rate. This implied ratio is then the basis of Canada’s MCI.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, BoC uses MCI as its operational target instead
of monetary aggregates and is updated monthly. It sets a target for the rate of inflation,
and given the anticipated inflationary pressures, policy actions are taken to achieve this
target. At the same time, it sets a provisional path for MCI that would be consistent
with the achievement of the targeted outcome for inflation. To complement these
measures, it makes considerable use of a broad range of economic and financial indi-
cators (such as monetary and credit aggregates as well as collective wage settlements)
to help in its analysis of current and anticipated economic developments.52
Other central banks have followed BoC in constructing MCI but the extent to
which they are used in monetary policy management differs.
                                                
52 Gonzalez-Hermosillo and Ito, p. 9.
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The RBNZ is also a main user of MCI until January 199953 that extends its use
by projecting the desired path of its MCI and takes the further step of announcing this
path publicly. RBNZ’s MCI is based on a model built by Nadal-De Simone, Dennis and
Redward (1996) that covers first quarter 1987 up until second quarter 1995. Output and
price equations are computed for nominal version of the model which include core CPI
and potential output as dependent variables and interest rate, foreign three-month inter-
est rates, foreign GDP, export price index of New Zealand’s major trading partners,
nominal effective exchange rate and monetary aggregate.54 The real version includes
real output as dependent variable and real exchange rate and real interest rate as inde-
pendent variables. RBNZ used real version of the model with output as dependent vari-
able to arrive at real MCI.
In a similar vein, the Central Bank of Norway publishes computed MCI in its
inflation report. Norway’s MCI is based on a single-equation model of aggregate de-
mand of Jore (1994) that runs from first quarter 1985 to fourth quarter 1994. The quar-
terly model underlying the Norwegian MCI takes the form of output gap as dependent
variable with only interest rate and exchange rate as independent variables. Based on
Jore’s equation, the MCI weight in terms of real exchange rate is 1:2, which would
mean that a one percent change in the real exchange rate has about the same effect on
aggregate demand as a two percentage point change in the interest rate.55
Other central banks explored the MCI concept. Mayes and Viren (Bank of Fin-
land) calculated a monetary indicator for the EURO Area (Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom) using quarterly data for each of the countries over the period
1972 to 1997.56 Based on the relative weights estimated by Mayen and Viren, two
MCIs for the EURO Area are constructed based on ratios 1:2.5 and 1:5.5 in terms of the
exchange rate.
                                                
53 In February 1999,  RBNZ announced that it was abandoning its MCI.  From 17 March 1999, it will set
an “Official Cash Rate (OCR)” to determine overnight interest rates in the money markets so that in fu-
ture they should be less volatile. The OCR is an interest rate set by the RBNZ to implement monetary
policy to achieve the  ultimate objective of  price stability.  By setting  the OCR, RBNZ is able to sub-
stantially influence short-term interest rates, such as the 90-day Treasury bill rate and  floating mort-
gages.  See  The Economist, “G’day Goldilocks,” 6-12  March 1999, p. 72.
54 Nadal De-Simone, Dennis, Redward, p. 15.
55 Eika, Ericson, Nymoen,”  p. 20.
56 Mayes and Viren, p.1.
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Another study made by Peeters explored the concept of MCI to the European
and Monetary Union (EMU) member countries that include Belgium, France, Ger-
many, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom based on two global macromod-
els, NIGEM (the National Institute Model, London) and EUROMON (De Nederland-
sche Bank). However, aside from using nominal short-term interest rate only, the model
also incorporated nominal long-term interest rate. The computed MCI weights indicate
higher pressure from interest rates rather than the exchange rates, and higher pressure
from long-term rates than from short-term rates.57 The Bank of Thailand also estimated
MCI that suggests the relative importance of interest rate over exchange rate on infla-
tion. The implied MCI weight is 1:3.3 in terms of the exchange rate.
Other central banks and institutions like the IMF and the OECD are confined to
computation of MCI. The Reserve Bank of Australia has similarly computed and ana-
lyzed several versions of MCI. In its World Economic Outlook (May 1996), the IMF
came up with MCIs of selected major industrial countries (Germany, France, Italy and
the United Kingdom) with the index defined as a weighted average of the percentage
point change in the real short-term interest rate and the percentage change in the real
effective exchange rate from base period of January 1990. In terms of real exchange
rate, relative MCI weights of 1:3 are used for France, Italy and the United Kingdom,
and 1:2.5 for Germany.58
In its Economic Outlook (June 1996), the OECD also computed MCIs for se-
lected countries as a way of talking about their overall monetary conditions which take
into account movements in real exchange rates as well as real short-term interest rates.
Computed weights reflect the relative impact of proportional changes in each compo-
nent on real GDP and are derived from the OECD’s Interlink Model with first quarter
of 1990 as base year. The weights in terms of the exchange rate are as follows: United
States, 1:9; Japan, Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom, 1:4; Australia, 1:2.3;
Sweden, Spain , 1:1.5.59
The relative differences in weights of different countries could be explained by
the use of different types of models and whether they have calibrated  their measures to
                                                
57 Peeters, p. 201.
58 IMF  World Economic Outlook, May 1996, p. 16.
59 OECD Economic Outlook, June 1996,  p. 31.
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indicate pressures on output or prices or a combination. Some countries use macroe-
conometric model while others use structural or single-equation models. The relatively
higher weight given for interest rate by all the countries in this survey reveals the fact
that in virtually all systems in developed economies, the more important channel re-
mains to be the interest rate. And within these developed countries’ systems, the differ-
ences in the weights given to interest rates depend on the size of the economy. For
relatively larger economy, the highest weight is seen in the United States, followed by
Japan, Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom.
3.5 Criticisms Raised Against MCI
Main criticisms advanced against the use of MCI are summarized by Peeters
(1999)60 into four main points. First, the short-term interest rate and the exchange rate
are not the only factors that influence monetary conditions. Other factors such as the
long-term interest and asset prices are also important to assess the monetary policy
stance. Second, the weights attached to the interest and exchange rates are not directly
observed and are model dependent. Furthermore, it has been argued that the value of an
MCI for conducting economic policy is doubtful because it relies on strong assump-
tions which have not been thoroughly investigated. These assumptions concern dy-
namics, cointegration, exogeneity, parameter constancy and omitted variables. Work
that critically examined the limitations of MCI has been done by Stevens (1998). Third,
interest and exchange rates are added straightforwardly. King (1997) argues that any
attempt to construct a simple monetary conditions index is akin to monetary policy to
adding together apples and oranges.61 And fourth, the relation between interest and ex-
change rates is assumed to be dependent on time. As King (1997) argues, it would
make little sense to trade off interest rates and the exchange rate according to computed
constant weights.
Several studies raised the difficulty in the estimation of the impact of the inter-
est and exchange rates on either aggregate demand or prices and no method is totally
satisfactory.62 While some of the technical arguments raised may be valid if the MCI is
                                                
60 Peeters, pp. 186-187.
61 Peeters, p. 187.
62 Mayes and  Viren, p.2.
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to be viewed as a long-run fundamental economic relationship, this paper argues that
the usefulness of MCI as a short-term indicator of the stance of monetary policy is not
necessarily diminished even if it incorporates certain strong assumptions. This paper
continues to argue that in order to account for these potential problems, the actual path
is recalibrated as often as possible as what the BoC utilizes. On balance, the funda-
mental arguments in favor of MCI are simplicity, convenience and broadness of using
both the interest and exchange rates as short-run indicators of domestic monetary policy
stance in the face of an open economy.
4 THE PHILIPPINE MONETARY CONDITIONS INDEX
The concept of MCI provides a continual reminder to monetary authorities that
there are other channels aside from the interest rate that could bring about changes in
the real economy. As what Chapter III suggests, in the final analysis, the fundamental
argument in favor of MCI continues to be its simplicity, convenience and broadness of
using both the interest and exchange rates in gauging domestic monetary conditions in
the face of an open economy. Along this argument, the concept of MCI is then applied
to the Philippines.
What follows are detailed sections on the way Philippine MCI is constructed -
the nature of variables, the econometric estimates, weight and base year – as well as
some simulations, operational considerations for guiding policy and analysis. Some ca-
veats regarding its use are likewise discussed.
4.1 Construction of Philippine MCI
4.1.1. Nature of Variables. Real variables are used in this paper.
These variables are argued to have the most direct connection with macroeco-
nomic variables as they weed out price effects. While there are lags in the availability
of the price data from main trading partners of the Philippines that are used in calcu-
lating REER, estimates of price movements of its trading partners which are argued to
exhibit stable movements, can be used.
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4.1.2 The Econometric Estimation
Econometric Estimation 63
Λln GDP = C-α ΛlnREERMAJOR(-8) - βΛlnBANK(-9) + χΛlnGOV(-6) - δΛlnGDP(-3)
where,
C = Constant
Λ = Difference operator
ln = Natural logarithm
GDP = Real gross domestic product
REERMAJOR = Real effective exchange rate of peso with major trading
    partners
BANK = Real average bank lending rate of commercial banks
GOV = Real government spending
4.1.2.1 The Data Set
The estimation equation represents the aggregate demand in the domestic econ-
omy (measured as the first difference in the logarithm of real GDP in 1985 pesos, thus
measuring quarter-on-quarter GDP growth) from first quarter of 1989 up until the first
quarter of 1999 and is explained by four variables. These explanatory variables include
(a) real effective exchange rate (REER) with major trading partners of the Philippines64
(lagged by eight quarters) (REERMAJOR), (b) real average bank lending rate (lagged
by nine quarters) (BANK), (c) real government spending (lagged by six quarters)
(GOV), and (d) real GDP (lagged by three quarters) (GDP).
The REER with Philippine major trading partners (with 1980 as base year) is
reported by BSP. This series is computed by deflating the nominal effective exchange
rate index (NEERI) using the consumer price index of the major trading partners
weighted by the total trade (export plus import) of the Philippines to these countries. If
REER  goes  up,  this  signals  a  decrease  in  its  value or an appreciation in the real ex
                                                
63 Based on equation 1, the growth of seasonally-adjusted U.S. gross domestic product in 1992 dollars as
reported by the International Financial Statistics is used as a proxy for foreign economic activity.  The
U.S. market accounted for nearly 35 percent of the export shipments made by the Philippines as of end-
1998.  But in the course of regression estimation, this variable was dropped out as it proved to be insig-
nificant to the model, implying that US GDP growth alone could not explain foreign economic activity.
64 These major trading partners include the United States,  Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom.
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change rate making Philippine exports less price-competitive. On the other hand, if
REER goes down, this signals a depreciation in the real exchange rate which makes
Philippine exports relatively more price-competitive.
For domestic interest rate, the 90-day commercial paper rate is used in most
studies. It is argued that changes in policy and interbank rates lead to changes in bank
loan rates for borrowers, which may affect investment decisions, and in deposit rates,
which may affect the choice between consuming now and later.65 In this model, the av-
erage real bank lending rate of ten sample commercial banks is used as reported by
BSP.66 This is the rate which banks charge for domestic consumption and production
for both the home and overseas markets. To transform it into the real interest rate, the
quarterly inflation rate is subtracted from the nominal average bank lending rate. Infla-
tion is measured by the quarterly changes in prices tracked in the Consumer Price Index
(1994=100) as reported end of quarter by the National Statistics Office (NSO).
Government consumption expenditure is in 1985 pesos as reported by the Na-
tional Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB).
4.1.2.2 Testing for Stationarity of Data
Having discussed the individual time series included in the estimation, the next
concern is to determine whether a particular series is stationary or non-stationary. A
stationary time series has a constant mean and variance over time, which implies that
following a random disturbance it returns over time to its equilibrium or average value
so that the random disturbance has no permanent effect on it. A non-stationary series,
on the other hand, is characterized by some upward or downward trend over time,
which implies a nonconstant variance so that it does not tend to return over time to its
equilibrium or average value after a random disturbance and simply drifts as in a ran-
dom walk, an evidence that it has a unit root.67
                                                
65 BIS policy paper, p. 9.
66 In the regression estimation, real overnight RRP rate, real 90-day Treasury bill rate, real time deposit
rate failed to show significant effects on real GDP.
67 Valdepeñas, p.15.  See also Mukherjee, White and Wuyts, Econometrics and Data Analysis for Devel-
oping Countries, Chapter 10 (Trends, Spurious Regressions and Transformation to Stationarity) and
Maddala, G.S., Introduction to Econometrics, 2nd edition, Chapter 13 (Introduction to Time Series
Analysis).
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Formal tests could be used to test whether a particular time series follows a ran-
dom walk. Here the augmented Dickey-Fulller (ADF) test is applied to analyze the sta-
tionarity of GDP, REERMAJOR, BANK, GOV, real US GDP (USGDP) and residual
(GDPRESID) (Refer to Technical Appendix, Tables 1a to 1g for E-VIEWS results).
Table 1a summarizes the results of ADF test applied to the original variables.
Except BANK, GDPRESID and USGDP (at 10 percent level of significance only), all
ADF statistics on levels turn out to be insignificant, indicating nonrejection of the null
hypothesis that the series is nonstationary at 5% and 10% levels of significance. Mov-
ing to first differences, the ADF tests all produced significant test statistics for all the
variables at 5% and 10% levels of significance, indicating stationarity of the first dif-
ference. On this basis, first differences of the levels are used to arrive at estimated coef-
ficients.
4.1.2.3  Testing for Stability of Data
The data sets are also examined to see whether they are stable across various
subsamples or if they exhibit structural change, hence, cannot be pooled in regression
estimation. For this purpose, Chow’s Forecast Test is used. The sample uses first quar-
ter 1994 (post-liberalization period) and first quarter 1996 (period when capital inflows
surged significantly) as cut-off points. Both tests produce insignificant F-statistic, indi-
cating stability of data at 5 percent level of significance. 68
4.1.3 The Estimated Coefficients
The subsequent analysis of regression results is based on Model A as it appears
that the estimated coefficients tend to be statistically credible when compared to Mod-
els B (that includes US GDP) and C (that assumes similar lag effects for exchange and
interest rates on GDP) (See Technical Appendix, Table 2a). The estimation equation is
assumed to be linear and is estimated on the basis of their first differences with lags.
                                                
68 The Chow forecast test estimates the model  for subsample comprised of the first group of observa-
tions (T1).  The estimated model is then used to predict the values of the dependent variable in the re-
maining group of observations (T2).  A large difference between the actual and predicted values casts
doubt on the stability of the estimated relation over the two groups of observations.  Using F-statistic,
two years are used to test stability of data:
          F-statistic Probability
1994:1 1.661473   0.300907
1996:1 0.525138   0.870684
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Lags are determined those which proved to be significant to the model. Its estimation
by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression over the sample period yielded the fol-
lowing coefficients with their corresponding t ratios in parenthesis listed directly below
and other diagnostics telling on the quality of the overall fit:
The Estimated Coefficients
GDP =  0.007 – 0.588REERMAJOR(-8) – 0.065BANK(-9) + 1.411GOV(-6)
                    (0.566)          (-2.057)                  (-2.198)               (3.691)
–  0.425GDP(-3)
       (-3.651)
R2 (adjusted) = 0.585  DW  = 2.024  DW-h statistic = - 0.115   F = 11.569  N = 41
The complete specification is contained in Technical Appendix, Tables 2b to
2d, the EVIEWS printout of the model. The estimated coefficients have the expected
signs.69 All time-series components (except the constant term) are statistically signifi-
cant at 5 percent level of significance with probability values that are practically equal
to zero.70
From the estimated equation, it follows that both the exchange and interest rates
influence GDP growth. Assuming all other things to be constant, a one percent increase
(decrease) in real lending rate decreases (increases) GDP growth by 0.07 percent while
a one percent appreciation (depreciation) in REER depresses (stimulates) GDP growth
by 0.59 percent.
The overall fit of the estimated equation looks fairly good as 58 percent of the
variation in GDP from first quarter 1989 up until first quarter of 1999 is explained by
                                                
69 It should be noted that the equation was tested for exact collinearity (defined in EVIEWS as  “near
singular matrix”).   The regressors are exactly collinear if one regressor can be written as a linear combi-
nation of the other regressors.  Based on regression results, the equation does not exhibit any form of
exact collinearity.
70 The   t-test result  implies that the constant term is statistically insignificant, hence, can be dropped
from the model.   This result also implies that the model is regressed through the origin.  But in this
model, the constant term is maintained since dropping it from the model and insisting on fitting a regres-
sion through the origin (even if there is an intercept)  could lead to serious specification error.  See Gu-
jarati, Damodar N., Basic Econometrics, 2nd edition, 1988, McGraw-Hill International Editions, p. 138
and Mukherjee, White, and Wuyts, p. 136.
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changes in REER and real lending rate along with government consumption spending
and previous changes in GDP. It should be noted that this relatively low adjusted R2 is
usually the case when variables regressed are in “first differences.” A significant F sta-
tistic suggests that the slope coefficients are clearly different from zero and tends to
confirm the overall goodness-of-fit of the regression.
The Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic indicates the absence of autocorrelation.
However, if the equation contains a lagged dependent variable, then the OLS estimates
are argued to be biased and inefficient.71 In this equation, the lagged value of the de-
pendent variable GDP shows up as another explanatory variable, that is, autoregressive.
In effect, this could mean that its current behavior is interpreted to be explained by its
past movements. This way of specifying the model suggests that this quarter’s change
in real GDP is partly influenced by its own changes during the last three quarters. Mad-
dala argues that there are instances under which lagged dependent variable can be used
as independent variable. Broadly, these could arise from among other things, expecta-
tions and adjustments. In this case, DW test is not applicable. A test to account for this
case is DW - h statistic. The computed DW h statistic is -0.115, indicating that there is
no first-order serial correlation. 72
Moreover, real GDP appears to respond sluggishly to changes in monetary con-
ditions to the extent that it lags behind changes in the real exchange rate and the real
bank lending rate by eight quarters and nine quarters, respectively. On top of this, it
also lags behind government consumption spending by six quarters and its own changes
by three quarters. These lag effects are however not unusual. The inclusion of lagged
values of the variables is argued to aid in a better estimation of parameters. In general,
there are certainly delays and lags at every stage of policy transmission that could be
prevalent during the period of recognition of any disturbance to decision mechanism
and further to implementation (inside lag) as well as to the timing of the effects of the
                                                
71 Mukherjee, White, and Wuyts, p.  370.
72 Computed using Durbin-Watson h statistic formula: h = [(1- 1/2d) (√N/(1- var χ))], where d is the
original DW statistic, N is the number of observations, varχ is variance of lagged dependent variable
used as an independent variable.  The decision rule is as follows: (a) if computed h > 1.96, reject the  null
hypothesis that there is no first-order positive first-order correlation; (b) if computed h < -1.96, reject the
null hypothesis that there is no negative autocorrelation; and (c) if h lies between –1.96 and 1.96, do not
reject the null hypothesis that there is no first-order (positive or negative) autocorrelation.  See Gujarati,
pp. 526-527.  Also see Maddala, pp. 248-249.
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policy action on the economy that are spread over time (outside lag).73 As regards
monetary policy, though it is perceived to be capable of being continuously adjusted, a
smooth transmission mechanism is not at all times possible because its final effects are
not entirely predictable and subject to variable lags.74
The propagation of lending rate depends upon various factors, including the or-
ganization of financial markets and the state of expectations. Moreover, among the
variables in the equation, it shows the longest delays in affecting the real economy.
Between the exchange and interest rates, simulations with macroeconometric models
suggest that the interest rate has the least effects on real economic activity.75 This is
followed by the real exchange rate. However, this is not unusual and is well docu-
mented in studies in other countries. Valdepeñas enumerated some of these studies that
reinforced the argument that it takes some time for any adjustment in the real exchange
rate to affect first the trade balance and consequently output. For instance, in their
analysis of the U.S. dollar appreciation in 1980-1985 and its depreciation in 1985 –
1988, Caves, Frankel and Jones noted that evidence of their respective impacts on
exports and imports showed up only either by end-1986 in the case of appreciation or
by end-1987 in the case of the depreciation.76 Briefly, there are various factors that
could explain these delayed responses to changes in the exchange rate. One factor could
be attributed to information and recognition lags aggravated by language and distance
factors. Second factor could also be due to bureaucratic or technical lags. A third factor
could be the order-delivery lags and fourth, expectations-ridden decision-making which
ends up in lagged reaction.
Based on respective beta coefficients, what seem to drive changes in real GDP
                                                
73 The inside or internal lag is further divided into recognition lag or the period that elapses between a
disturbance occurs and the time the policymakers recognize that action is required and the decision and
action lags or the delay between the recognition of the need for action and policy decision.  See Dorn-
busch, R., Fischer, S., and Startz, R., Macroeconomics, 7th edition,  1998,  Irwin McGraw-Hill,  pp. 417-
420.
74 Friedman, Milton,  “The Lag in Effect of Monetary Policy,” The Journal of Political Economy, Vol-
ume LXIX, The University of Chicago Press, February-December, 1961,  p. 447.  Friedman was  chal-
lenged by Culbertson (University of Wisconsin) with his assertion that based on the broad record of ex-
perience leads to expect that the predominant direct effects of monetary and other changes will occur
within three to six months.   See also Jha, p.  110.
75 Smets, Frank, “Financial Asset Prices and Monetary Policy:  Theory and Evidence,” BIS Working
Paper No. 47, Monetary and Economic Department, September 1997, p. 11.
76 Valdepeñas,  p. 24.
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is government consumption spending followed by the competitiveness of Philippines as
indicated by the real exchange rate, its own changes during the previous quarters and
then real bank lending rate.
4.2 Real Monetary Conditions Index
Since there are lags in the availability of actual data on real GDP (approxi-
mately two quarters), a monthly real MCI based on REER of the peso and real lending
rate is constructed. Monetary policy will be reflected in present MCI as its movements
will eventually affect output. Therefore, it will be a leading indicator of movements in
output. It is computed from January 1989 up until June 1999 with December 1996 as
base year.
4.2.1 Base Year.
The real MCI uses 1996 as base year. In 1996 (particularly in the third quarter),
the economy sustained a higher growth path fueled largely by the strong performance
of investments and exports. The performance of the economy during previous years
was hounded by some shocks such as coup d'etat in the Aquino administration (1989),
earthquake (1990), eruption of Mt. Pinatubo (1991), growing fiscal deficit due to presi-
dential elections (1992), deregulation (1993) and Mexican crisis in late 1994 to early
1995. In 1996, inflation rate was brought down to single-digit following prudent
monetary policy, healthy fiscal position and rebound in agriculture which restored rice
supply to normal levels all contributed to the low inflation environment that conse-
quently led to softening of interest rates. Meanwhile, the overall balance of payments
remained in surplus as sustained investor confidence kept substantial foreign capital
and investments flowing in and as exports maintained their strong performance.
4.2.2 The MCI Ratio.
The weight REERMAJOR/BANK is termed as the MCI ratio. The ratio is esti-
mated at 1:1/9 (or 0.11) based on the estimated equation on Section 3. This ratio im-
plies that a one percent appreciation (depreciation) in REER has the same effect on
MCI as a 0.11 percent increase (decrease) in real lending rate, assuming all other things
are constant (Duguay, 1994). This contradicts estimates of most MCIs in which interest
rate is attributed a higher weight. But this finding remains valid in the Philippines as the
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exchange rate continues to be the most important price in the economy following its
heavy reliance to foreign investment to finance its investment requirements.
4.2.3 Computation of Real Monetary Conditions Index
Based on equation 3 and using MCI ratio of 1:1/9 in favor of REERMAJOR,
the index is constructed as follows -
Real  MCI = (REERMAJOR at current period/ REERMAJOR at base period -1) +
((1/(-.588/-0.065) (BANK at current period – BANK at base period) + 100
In this computation, BANK is measured in percentage points and
REERMAJOR as an index equal to 100 at its base period. This equation is scaled (that
is, REERMAJOR is transformed) such that a one point change in the MCI is equivalent
in its effect on aggregate demand to a one percent change in interest and exchange
rates. The overall picture of MCI is seen in Chart 5.
4.3 MCI Weight and Base Year Simulations
Different weights as well as base years are simulated to determine the impact of
these changes to MCI. Charts 6 and 7 indicate that changes in the relative weights as
well as base years alter the value of the index but not the qualitative picture.
Two separate MCIs are computed using January 1994 (post-liberalization pe-
riod) and April 1997 (before currency crisis) as base years. Together with computed
MCI using December 1996 as base year, all three indices behaved almost exactly the
same (Chart 6).
As regards weight simulations and taking December 1996 as base year, two
separate MCIs are calculated based on ratios of 1:0.12 and 1:0.10 for lending rate and
REER. With the computed MCI using 1:0.11 ratio, Chart 7 shows some differences in
the value of MCI but not the overall picture.
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4.4 Operational Considerations for Guiding Policy
The near stable prices that were already achieved by most developed countries
77 indicates that central banks can now be more explicit in its commitment to support
growth without undermining price stability. Like many other studies, this paper focuses
on real GDP effects with the view that monetary conditions are important for growth.78
A more important indicator of real economic activity is the output gap or the
difference between actual and potential output.79 Potential output represents that level
of output of the economy when all productive factors are at their fully employed levels.
Typically, it is derived from macroeconomic model. In the Philippines, potential output
could be derived from the Quarterly Macroeconometric Model (QMM) where an im-
portant innovation of the model's real sector is the important role assigned to potential
output and capacity utilization of the industry and services sectors.80 However, keeping
the QMM up to date and refining its equations are at present concerns of government
agencies. In the absence of figures of potential output, estimates of potential output are
used.81 Actual real GDP is then divided with potential output (or trend GDP) as meas-
ure of output gap. This indicates that if actual real output is below potential output (or
below 1.00), monetary policy has to be eased (implies declining MCI) to increase ag-
gregate demand. On the other hand, if the ratio is more than 1.00 or when actual output
is higher than potential output, then the economy is overheating and monetary policy
needs to be tightened (indicates rising MCI).
The estimated MCI is compared with the estimated output gap from January
1989 to June 1999 to see the relative effects of changes in MCI, hence, determines its
                                                
77 IMF World Economic Outlook , October 1999.
78 At the same time it should be emphasized that in terms of monetary policy,  Philippine experience
over the past few years reveals that real exchange rate and real interest rate seem to rather behave as in-
dependent variables in  the face of a more open economy.
79 Sachs,   J., Larrain, F., Macroeconomics In the Global Economy, 1993, Harvester Wheatsheaf, p. 45.
See also Dornbusch, Fischer and Startz,  p. 13.
80 The QMM is one of the components of the inter-agency project entitled "Development of Short-Term
Forecasting Models for the Philippines."  This project was implemented by the National Economic and
Development Agency (NEDA) and funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)
through the Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS).  This project was developed through
the efforts of  the Department of Finance (DOF), the Department of Budget and Management (DBM),
the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and the BSP together with consultants
funded by the project.
81 To derive potential output , actual real output is regressed on an intercept and a time trend using OLS.
The equation is defined as OLS GDP C TIME, where C is constant.  Using values for time, trend for
GDP is assumed to be potential output.
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usefulness for policy formulation (Chart 8). Simple trend line reveals that the generally
loose monetary conditions during the period are accompanied by the very moderate in-
crease in the output gap. The significant spikes in the output gap every fourth quarter
could be attributed to the seasonality of production. This should be corrected in the es-
timation of potential output.
At various points, it could also be seen that significant tightening of monetary
conditions leads to widening of the output gap with some lags, implying resources have
become unemployed and actual output falls below potential output. This is clearly seen
in significant dip in the output gap in 1992. Conversely, continues easing of monetary
conditions leads to narrowing of the output gap with some lags as increased availability
of resources allows the economy to produce more goods and services, thus resulting in
a rising level of output.
From the perspective of monetary management, the estimated MCI can be used
as one of the leading indicators of movements of the output gap. Though simple scatter
diagram between the estimated MCI (quarterly average) and the output gap reveals a
somewhat flatter regression line (implying relatively loose relationship) (Figure 6) and
a simple coefficient of correlation of only around 11.0 percent, the estimated MCI can
still be argued to contain information on the possible behavior of the output gap. This
information is particularly valuable to monetary authorities as a way to monitor the
possible consequences of its actions and contain possible risks inherent in the conduct
of monetary policy.
The estimated MCI can also entail warnings on monetary authorities if they are
hanging on too loose or too tight in their stance that could consequently entail signifi-
cant adjustments to the real economy. If the monetary authorities focus on the MCI, the
need for contractionary or expansionary stance would show up directly in the index. In
the absence of an MCI, there is greater likelihood that the monetary authorities would
not take timely policy actions. However, this does not imply that the monetary authori-
ties would always fail to react when needed but rather the lack of a direct mechanism
signaling the need to take appropriate actions would make it more likely that policy ac-
tions would be delayed.
Furthermore, a decomposition of MCI into lending rate and REER would give
monetary authorities a clearer picture of monetary policy stance that could help them
detect an impending crisis. Prior to July 7 crisis, MCI shows a continuous tightening of
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monetary conditions as peso-dollar rate showed sustained real appreciation while
higher interest rates were jacked up to meet program targets with the IMF.
The key issue here involves the implied trade-off between the interest and ex-
change rates in the MCI. In the final analysis, movements in MCI hinges on a great deal
on knowing what else is going on. Certainly, it matters why the movement in either the
interest or exchange rate has taken place. It could be temporary and be reversed.
Monetary authorities need to have time to consider what an exchange rate movement
means, before making a decision as to whether interest rates should move in offsetting
direction.
4.5 Analysis of Philippine MCI
Relative to December 1996 and for over longer horizon (January 1989 to June
1999), MCI exhibits generally expansionary monetary conditions against demand pres-
sures, albeit at moderate pace (Chart 5). When compared with actual quarterly real
GDP growth over the same period, this generally loose monetary stance appears to be
part and parcel of the moderate decline in the growth trend (Chart 9). Across this pe-
riod, the MCI shows two periods of significant changes in monetary conditions that
happened during the period 1990 to 1992 and 1995 to 1997.
The first period is characterized by gradual deceleration in MCI from October
1990 until August 1991 and steady increase up to March 1992. The early phase of this
period was characterized by relatively tight monetary conditions when a balance of
payments crisis emerged towards the latter part of 1990, hastened by the rise in the oil
prices following the Gulf War (Chart 10). This caused severe speculation in the market
that reflected in the nominal depreciation of the peso relative to the US dollar. To calm
the market, the CBP stepped up its open operations mainly through RRP facility and in
December 1990 increased banks’ total reserve ratio to 25 percent (the highest so far
since 1986). The CBP sold dollars in the foreign exchange market during the last quar-
ter of the year to defend the peso. As a result, BSP’s real RRP rate rose to 41.3 percent
at the end of 1990 while real bank lending rate remained double-digit. From 5.2 percent
at the first quarter of 1992, real GDP growth dropped to 0.3 percent during the fourth
quarter while inflation reached 15.3 percent at the end of the year. However, as soon as
the speculation in the market died down, monetary conditions started to ease as re-
flected in the decline of MCI from January 1991 to August 1991. Banks’ total reserve
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ratio was lowered to 24 percent in January 1991 while BSP’s RRP rate dropped to sin-
gle digit following the decline in borrowings in reverse repurchase facility. Real lend-
ing rate dropped to 5.1 percent in April and further down to 0.6 percent in August 1991.
Real 91-day Treasury bill rate similarly declined from a high of 16.6 percent in Sep-
tember 1990 to 2.2 percent in April 1991. The decline in major interest rates during this
period was accompanied by a brief real depreciation in October to December 1990 but
appreciated at the start of 1991. During this period inflation remained double-digit
while real GDP declined from first quarter to the third quarter.
This relatively expansionary monetary stance was however short-lived. A se-
vere energy crisis hit the economy that affected strongly production sector towards the
end of 1991.82 This problem was further complicated by CBP’s own deficit that re-
sulted from uncollectable loans and past borrowings that left CBP with negative net-
worth.83 To finance its deficit, CBP bonds were issued in May 1991 amounting to P5.4
billion. This institutional problem made CBP dependent on NG through the Bureau of
Treasury for open market operations through the Treasury bill market. At the same
time, there were pressures to NG and CBP to comply with IMF quantitative targets.
These domestic shocks as well as institutional constraints altogether led to aggressive
intervention of the CBP in the market. The CBP borrowed heavily from the market by
issuing CBP bills starting October 1991 that persisted until February 1992. At the same
time, NG built up its deposits with the CBP to mop excess liquidity from the system.
The active open market operations were seen in dramatic increases in its key rates.
Overnight RRP rate rose from 5.5 percent in June 1991 to 16.2 percent in September
1991 and further to 18.8 percent in November 1991. The real 91-day Treasury bill rate
increased again from 1.9 percent in September 1991 to 9.7 percent in February 1992.
Other interest rates followed soon as real lending rate reached a high of 14.7 percent in
October 1991.
Meanwhile, in the foreign exchange market, a real appreciation of the peso ac-
companied the dramatic increases in interest rates. This significant tightening of mone-
tary conditions led to the dramatic decline in real investment growth to 17 percent in
                                                
82 Vos, Rob and Josef Yap, The Philippine Economy:  East Asia’s Stray Cat?, International Finance and
Development Series, Institute of Social Studies, 1996, p. 23.
83 Krugman, Paul, J. Alm, S. Collins, E. Remolona, “Transforming the Philippine Economy,” A
NEDA/United Nations Development Program Report, Pasig City, Philippines, June 1992.
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1991 while current account position remained in deficit at US$858 million or 1.6 per-
cent of GNP. While inflation was contained at single digit in 1992 at 8.6 percent, the
real economy absorbed the painful adjustment as growth was posted at 1.6 percent (Ta-
ble 3).
The second period covers the gradual uptrend of MCI from October 1995 to
August 1997 followed by the significant drop thereafter until November 1998 (Chart
11). Some significant reforms were put in place before this period. The Philippines re-
stored its stabilization and structural reform measures with the IMF. The previously
insolvent CBP was restructured and recapitalized. This restructuring is important, as it
has made possible the conduct of independent monetary policy. Another important re-
form measure was the significant liberalization of the exchange system in August 1992
that provided some form of reassurance to potential investors that income and capital
could be repatriated freely. Shortly after liberalization measures on the exchange sys-
tem were finally put in place, the Philippines entered into debt restructuring agreement
with commercial banks in December 1992 to help in the rehabilitation of the country's
external position. These twin measures paved the way for the Philippine access to ex-
change and capital markets.
These reforms led to salient changes in the economy. For one, capital flows
came rushing into the economy, which (as a proportion of GNP) more than doubled at
the end of 1994 or about 5.9 percent of nominal GNP (Chart 12). Interest rates became
a bit sensitive to foreign interest rates (although the gap is substantial at more than 10
percentage points in 1998) while the link between the BSP RRP rate and interbank rate
have loosened as seen in their simple coefficients of correlation.84 A trend real appre-
ciation of the peso was noted. Banks start to depend on foreign market for liquidity
support instead of the BSP. This is shown in the significant upsurge in monetary for-
eign liabilities starting 1995.
However, important weaknesses in the economy remained, many of which were
legacies of past economic crises. The savings rate has remained low, thus increasing the
                                                
84 The coefficients of correlation between lending, three-month LIBOR, BSP RRP rate and interbank
rate for two periods are as follows:
Lending-LIBOR IBCL-RRP
1989-1993      0.76     0.52
1994-1998      0.79     0.35  
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dependence of the economy on foreign capital for its investment requirements. Gross
domestic savings as percent of GNP reached 16.3 percent compared to gross domestic
investments of 23.6 percent of GNP at the end of 1993. This dependence was high-
lighted by the economy’s susceptibility to a major external shock during this period -
the currency crisis in July 1997.85
The MCI shows steady increase from October 1995 to June 1997 only to rise
dramatically in July to August 1997. This period was generally characterized by in-
creasing real interest rates. The period prior to the currency crisis was accompanied by
surge in capital inflows that were intermediated through banks. These flows have
caused credit extended to the private sector to jump significantly. In August 1996, year-
on-year growth credit extended by banks to the private sector reached more than 56
percent, the highest since the 80s. A closer look at the nature of bank loans outstanding
by economic activity reveals a notable year-on-year growth of 97.2 percent in end-1996
to financial institutions, real estate and business services sector (Table 4).
These developments alarmed the BSP. The BSP responded by heeding on the
side of caution by siphoning off excess liquidity in the system through the reverse re-
purchase market. Real overnight RRP rate rose from 2.1 percent in November 1990 to
5.1 percent in September 1996 and further to 19.9 percent when the peso was allowed
to float. As a result, compliance with the IMF monetary ceilings was significant. In
1996 alone, average BM overperformance86 was P33.2 billion or 12.7 percent of the
target (Chart 13).
The increase in interest rates has put pressure on the peso to appreciate. How-
ever, this real appreciation was matched by BSP’s purchases at the foreign exchange
market to beef up its reserves. BSP’s purchases amounted to US$6.6 billion in 1996 or
about 26 percent of the total purchases (BSP plus commercial banks) at the Philippine
Dealing System. At the end of 1996, BSP’s gross international reserves amounted to
US$10.0 billion, equivalent to about 3.2 months of imports of goods and services from
only US$5.9 billion at the end of 1995. The REER appreciated slightly by 0.5 percent
from October 1995 to August 1997. This slight real appreciation as what Houben
                                                
85 The Philippine economy also felt the spill over effects of Tequila crisis towards the end of 1994 until
the early part of 1995.  However, the effects to growth performance were moderate.
86 Defined where actual BM is less than program targets.
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(1997) argues could be attributed to the one-off factors linked to the general recovery of
confidence in the peso as the economic and political uncertainties have declined and
exchange restrictions have progressively been lifted and the upward adjustment of the
equilibrium exchange rate itself.87 Or could also be driven by price increases in non-
tradeables sector that could be seen from the growth in loans extended by banks to fi-
nancial institutions, business services and real estate. Another factor could be attributed
to the significant rise in capital inflows. But what is more important is that the moderate
real appreciation of the peso could also be driven by BSP’s intervention in the foreign
exchange market. This could be seen in Figure 7 which plots monthly changes in the
nominal effective exchange rate against monthly BSP net intervention in the foreign
exchange market (expressed as percent of RM) from October 1995 to August 1997.
Observations are concentrated on the upper quadrant, top right, which indicates BSP’s
intervention policies (in particular net purchases at the foreign exchange rate market)
are oftentimes geared to prevent further appreciation of the peso. Conversely, it could
also be seen that BSP’s strategy to sell when it depreciates is seen in points at the lower
quadrant, bottom left. This figure suggests asymmetry in policy intervention as it is
pursued more aggressively to prevent pressure from appreciation than depreciation.
The tight monetary stance was maintained through early September (two
months after the currency crisis broke out) but was then eased briefly, before policies
had to be strengthened again in early October in order to meet monetary targets under
the IMF program. Since then, monetary policy has been relaxed until November 1998
apart from brief periods of tightening in early December and late January 1998. The
BSP subsequently lowered its borrowing rates gradually and progressively lowered its
total required reserve ratio to 17 percent as of end-July as the pressure in the foreign
exchange market subsided and inflation has stabilized.
But even as BSP rates along with required reserve ratio were lowered, bank
lending rate remained relatively high due to the banks’ cautious lending stance amid
concern over borrowers ability to repay. To induce further deceleration in lending rate,
the BSP implemented steps to inject liquidity into the system. The BSP opened a 30-
day lending window and swap window for banks without government securities and
purchased banks’ government securities at market rates. At the same time, the BSP ex-
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ercised moral suasion over commercial banks as it sought their cooperation to lower
lending rates while NG rejected relatively high bids in 90-day Treasury bills and tapped
foreign sources to finance its expenditures.
These efforts, complemented with the global concern to cut interest rates among
central banks during the last quarter of 1998 to avert any possible global recession, was
felt in the system by a significant drop in key interest rates. Treasury bill rates and bank
lending rates decelerated and helped chances for sustaining recovery of domestic de-
mand while inflation, despite some adverse weather conditions, remained subdued.
Real bank lending rate dropped significantly from a high of 14.1 percent in January
1998 to 2.4 percent in November 1998. In a similar vein, real 91-day Treasury bill rate
declined from 12.1 percent at the start of 1998 to 2.3 percent in November. The coun-
try's external accounts position has likewise adjusted rapidly, in part reflecting a sub-
stantial decline in imports due to weaker economy. However, strong growth has also
been contributing to the achievement of a current surplus and a positive overall balance
of payments position. Though real investments remain sluggish, declining by 22.2 per-
cent during the fourth quarter of 1998, real GNP remained positive at 0.1 percent for
whole year 1998. These developments were reflected in a declining MCI as domestic
monetary conditions continued to ease.
Three things can be drawn from these developments that are reflected in MCI.
First, a decomposition of MCI shows REER and lending rate moving in opposite direc-
tions starting 1989, indicating monetary authorities’ objective to offset whatever expan-
sionary impact there could arise to lid on the inflationary pressures. While REER shows
trend real appreciation (implying tight monetary stance), lending rate exhibits trend
slowdown (suggesting expansionary monetary stance) (Chart 14). Second, these devel-
opments could be attributed to a combination of factors including a mix of monetary,
exchange rate and intervention policies along with structural rigidities that overall im-
parts growth bias. Third, this further suggests that the scope of independent monetary
policy management is relatively narrow as internal and external shocks as well as occa-
sional interventions to comply with IMF monetary targets heavily influenced monetary
policy.
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4.6 Some Caveats in the Use of MCI
While the MCI is a useful indicator of the monetary policy stance, it should not
be used in an overly mechanical fashion. In particular, the monetary authorities should
avoid maintaining a precise MCI target in line with the daily fluctuations of the ex-
change rate. Policy action to offset the effect on the MCI is only required if the ex-
change rate is likely to be extended.
Since the MCI ratio is estimated econometrically, it is empirically based and
can be relied upon to the extent the underlying estimation is sound. In addition, the ra-
tio is an average measure over time, and may mask the differences in the relative
strength of interest and exchange rate effects, depending on actual conditions at that
time.
Finally, to the extent that some monetary policy channels are overlooked in the
construction of MCI, it will not fully reflect the overall stance of monetary policy. In
some cases, the MCI has been expanded to include other financial indicators such as
the yield gap between short-and long-term interest rates, equity prices and fiscal policy.
5 CONCLUSIONS, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND
IMPLICATIONS
5.1 Evaluation of Findings
This paper has established that the breakdown in money demand relationship
has resulted to the need to reassess the appropriate framework for monetary policy in
the Philippines. With uncertainties from liberalization of the economy as well as glob-
alization of financial markets, adherence to strict money supply rule suggests that
overlooking or underestimating these uncertainties can yield a less certain inflation out-
comes and may place an excessive adjustment on the real economy.
Though gauging domestic monetary conditions in an open economy continues
to be difficult, the need to circumvent these uncertainties by focusing both on the two
important prices in the domestic monetary stream – interest rate and exchange rate -
becomes clear. This paper presents a view of transmission of monetary policy that em-
phasizes the interest rate and the exchange rate channels rather than the monetary and
credit aggregates and other domestic price assets. It shows that strong linkages can be
estimated from the interest and exchange rates to total spending in the Philippines. To-
gether, these prices constitute MCI.
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This paper uses the methodology of MCI adopted by BoC and provides an
analysis of the real GDP effects of real bank lending rate and real effective exchange
rate in the Philippines. Empirical analysis suggests the inclusion of exchange rate to
MCI is sensible as it finds strong impact effects compared with interest rate changes.
This contradicts estimates of most MCIs in which interest rate is attributed a higher
weight. But this finding remains valid in the Philippines as the exchange rate continues
to be the most important price in the economy following its heavy reliance to foreign
investment to finance its investment requirements. Another salient point is the direction
of MCI that appears to be in line with actual movements of REER. One must be careful
in assessing future movements of the peso as it maybe adversely affected by risks of the
international market.
MCI could be virtually helpful. In particular, the usefulness of MCI can be
gleaned from its ability to contain some information on the likely movements of the
output gap given its current direction. Furthermore, a decomposition of MCI can aid
BSP in detecting some indications of an impending crisis.
While in most respects, the Philippine MCI is relatively attractive as it captures
both changes in the interest and exchange rates in explaining domestic monetary condi-
tions, the whole mechanism remains to be cautious. The coefficients in the estimated
equation should be dealt with prudence as it may be sensitive to structural changes in
the economy.
It should be emphasized that the MCI is not the BSP’s instrument. It serves as
an indicator of short-term domestic monetary policy stance. The inclusion of these two
prices and not the others reflects an empirical judgment. It does not preclude the use of
other channels as indicators of total spending in the conduct of monetary policy.
Also, it should be noted that exchange rate can move for reasons apart from
monetary policy. This indicates that MCI should not be viewed as a static measure.
The monetary authorities strategy to heed always on the side of caution by con-
tinuously seeking an alternative framework of domestic monetary conditions in the face
of uncertain and fast-changing world maximizes their chance to keep inflation manage-
able that will consequently impact on real output. The monetary authorities are cer-
tainly every bit as concerned with growth as price stability.
On these bases, the tentative conclusion can be formed that MCI is a useful
short-run measure of domestic monetary conditions in the face of an open economy.
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5.2 Policy Recommendations and Implications
It is clear from policy makers all over the world that liberalization of economies
and globalization of financial markets are here to stay. In fact, even the new BSP Gov-
ernor Rafael Buenaventura, in a newspaper interview, expects that all banks, foreign or
domestic, to provide the most competitive services for the country not through deregu-
lation or legislation, but through openness of the market.88
Given the usefulness of MCI, its possible adoption would require a number of
changes to monetary policy decision process not only for the Philippines but to all
countries adopting similar schemes as well.
As regards construction methodology, further improvement is needed especially
concerning the estimated equation that is the basis for getting weights of MCI. A better
indicator would be potential output. In the absence of QMM figures, Ghatak, Healey
and Jackson suggest a way of measuring potential output by examining peaks of the
economy. When plotting real GDP over time, joining the peaks of the trend line gives a
measure of the trend in productive potential. The rate of increase in real GDP from one
peak to another gives an indication of the rate of growth of productive potential. As
GDP rises, the resources in the economy become more fully employed. Once the full-
employment position of the economy is reached, the boom moves down into a reces-
sion. Therefore, joining up the peaks over time shows the path that the economy would
move along as if it was at full capacity.89 To improve the computation of potential out-
put, seasonal factors, like seasonality of production, have to be taken into account.
From the viewpoint of keeping up with the regional momentum, however, it
seems competitiveness should be kept under review. REER with respect to Philippine
competitor countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore) should also be as-
sessed as indicator of MCI.
A related area involves dynamics of the estimated equation, in particular, the
lags or delays in output response to changes in the interest and exchange rates. Prob-
lems would arise if these lags  are not the same  as in the case of estimated  equation in
                                                
88 As of 5 July 1999, the Philippines has 53 commercial banks, including 14 foreign banks.  Current
Philippine law restricts to 14 the number of foreign banks with branch licenses in the Philippines.  How-
ever, foreign banks may acquire up to 40.0 percent of any domestic commercial bank.
89 Ghatak, S.,  N. Healey, P. Jackson, The Macroeconomic Environment, 1992,  Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, p. 31.
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this paper. This implies that there is no neat trade-off between changes in the interest
rate and exchange rate at least in the short-run. But in the medium and long-term these
prices are expected to converge to effect final impacts on real output. This also implies
that policies that would directly affect exchange rate are expected to affect real output
faster than the interest rate. Here, the monetary authorities should be careful with this
difference in monetary policy formulation.
From the perspective of monetary policy formulation, the BSP must be explicit
and transparent in its single and overriding objective. The exchange rate should be seen
as an important part of the transmission mechanism, rather than a final goal. In short,
the BSP must demonstrate its willingness to commit to the single objective of promot-
ing a low inflation environment conducive to a sustainable growth. MCI should be en-
dorsed by both the National Government and the BSP. Other steps might include publi-
cation by the BSP of regular assessments of MCI, testimony before Congress using
MCI as measure of its monetary policy stance, and immediate announcements of policy
changes if there are any. Improvements in this regard would be desirable, however, re-
gardless, of the framework adopted.
There is a general consensus that the monetary policy environment entails risks
that could virtually affect the interest and exchange rates. It would be too difficult for
policymakers to know exactly what causes these shocks. But without coming to some
sort of assessment about what the underlying forces at work are, policymakers could
not decide what, if any, policy response is appropriate to changes in these prices.
On this account, it will be crucial to scrutinize further the extent and depth of
Philippine foreign exchange and financial markets. In particular, the BSP should have a
better handle of various instruments and products that banks create or offer to the fi-
nancial market. Examples are swap deposit transactions, which prior to the currency
crisis, were popular among big commercial banks. Such a probe into the workings of
the market for these transactions may bare underlying trends and peculiarities that
could be used in monetary policy strategies that can help determine how robust or thin
the market is and to what extent will it impact on the economy.
Towards this end, it is proposed that further modification of the monetary indi-
cators and vigilance in their monitoring be made along the following areas. First, de-
posit money banks’ or DMBs’ (commercial banks and rural banks accepting demand
deposits) statement of conditions which are the basis for Monetary Survey be carefully
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monitored. The Monetary Survey is a consolidation of the accounts of the monetary
authorities and DMBs that shows the financial relationship between the monetary in-
stitutions subsector – whose liabilities include the economy’s money supply – and other
sectors of the economy. From the asset side, it is composed of domestic and foreign
assets. From the liabilities side, it constitutes total liquidity or the sum of M3 and de-
posit substitutes and other liabilities (marginal deposits, bills payable). From the do-
mestic asset side, the BSP should monitor carefully the quality of loans extended by the
monetary system to the private sector not only to tradable sectors but more so to non-
tradable sectors such as financial services and real estate to determine if the economy is
overheating. Another schedule in domestic asset side that needs regular scrutiny is
DMBs’ investments account to determine the quality of banks’ investments.
From the foreign asset side, the BSP should also be vigilant in monitoring
schedule of banks’ net foreign asset to include not only levels but the nature and matu-
rities of foreign borrowings of commercial banks. Prior to currency crisis, this account
showed historically significant growth, indicating overborrowing from the international
market. It is also suggested that the scope of Monetary Survey be expanded to include
savings banks, other rural banks, development banks and non-banks such as investment
houses and finance companies to have a comprehensive picture of the financial system.
Finally, it is suggested that regular dialogue between the BSP and Bankers As-
sociation of the Philippines be observed to maintain transparency between these insti-
tutions.
From the foregoing consideration, it may be apparent that the MCI, after all has
little yet significant contribution to monetary policy strategies. It may not be a panacea
to crisis. It should be stressed that possible adoption of MCI does not itself guarantee an
immediate improvement in credibility of the BSP. Rather, the MCI can provide a
benchmark against which the BSP can build a record of low inflation conducive to
sustained growth credentials over a period of time.
On the other hand, unless the limitations in the use of MCI are properly and
neatly addressed, it would be risky for the BSP to abandon the present base money an-
chor. A quick exit away from a money target to dampen output volatility can beget new
risks as the Philippines is susceptible to internal as well as external shocks.
Admittedly, the use of MCI as a sole instrument for monetary policy manage-
ment while useful is limited. This implies that MCI would have to be supplemented by
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other existing policies and instruments, a whole gamut of which has to be tried and
tested, while new ones would have to be continually developed to expand the existing
menu of options to monetary policy management.
This brings us back to the entire empire of monetary policy and its management
as an effective strategy to overall development strategy. Certainly, more is involved
than just a question of reversing whatever negative impacts there might be in the proc-
ess of untimely and unfounded monetary strategy. Better domestic policies lie at the
heart of monetary policy. This implies vigilance to continuously seek alternative ways
to explain the changing monetary policy process while making prudential regulations
work better. These lessons seem to have been learned by Philippine monetary authori-
ties and other East Asian economies since the currency crisis in mid 1997. By putting
them to practice will require an enormous amount of discipline, commitment and po-
litical will.
Monetary authorities will continue to struggle and respond flexibly but cau-
tiously to any shocks but the strong commitment and support of private institutions
(banks and non-banks) to monetary policy strategy are essential if monetary authorities
are to find more definitive, workable and lasting solutions to threats of globalized fi-
nance. Obviously, the world is both more complex and more interesting than this and
with the broader field of monetary policy strategy, its flow of traffic is not one way ei-
ther.
TABLE  1
RESERVE MONEY AND ITS MAIN COMPONENTS
End-Period, In Billion Pesos
RESERVE MONEY Net Foreign Assets (NFA) Net Domestic Assets (NDA)
of which:
BSP Net FX
Annual Purchases(+)/ Total of which:
LEVELS % Change Total NIR Sales(-)  1/ NG Deposits OMO 2/
1986 51.0 32.7 -133.3 -16.2 750.9 184.3 -16.4 -30.5
1987 57.8 13.1 -132.2 -12.3 150.4 190.0 -42.6 -11.5
1988 67.3 16.5 -121.6 -8.0 217.1 188.9 -58.2 -10.3
1989 92.9 38.0 -108.2 3.6 483.9 201.1 -69.6 -6.9
1990 108.8 17.1 -140.5 1.9 -64.1 249.3 -67.3 -6.0
1991 129.4 19.0 -68.5 58.7 1845.8 197.9 -75.3 -56.2
1992 144.9 12.0 38.2 91.5 2250.3 106.7 -137.8 -90.8
1993 171.8 18.6 56.8 99.6 -51.9 115.0 -113.8 -48.7
1994 182.4 6.2 91.8 129.3 2928.9 90.6 -84.5 89.1
1995 212.8 16.6 118.4 155.5 1975.1 94.4 -73.4 113.8
1996 243.3 14.3 232.7 263.8 4642.5 10.6 -106.5 48.2
1997 266.5 9.5 211.9 266.7 -2641.3 54.6 -78.3 142.1
1998 239.8 -10.0 232.7 313.1 101.5 7.1 -59.5 152.8
1999 May 239.0 9.4 318.7 410.9 497.9 -79.7 -104.9 79.4
1/  In Million US$.
2/  OMO refers to CB/BSP lendings under the  repurchase facility (RP) less CBP/BSP borrowings under the reverse
     repurchase (RRP) facility and its issuances  of its own securities, namely, CB/BSP bills, CB notes, CB bonds and CBCIs.
     Starting December 1993,  OMO includes BSP holdings of Treasury bills.
Source of Data:  BSP-Department of Economic Research
TABLE 2
LEGAL RESERVE REQUIREMENTS AGAINST PESO DEPOSIT LIABILITIES AND DEPOSIT SUBSTITUTES OF COMMERCIAL
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TOTAL 1/ REGULAR RESERVEEffective
Date
Circular.
No.
LIQUIDITY
RESERVE 3/
Demand Savings Time 2/
Deposit
Substitutes 2/
"NOW"
Accts.
26-May-86 1104 22 22 22 22,6 22,6 22
4-Aug-86 1112 21 21 21 21,6 21,6 21
1-Dec-86 1122 21 21 21 21,5 21,5 21
23-Jun-89 1204 21 21 21 21,7 21,7 21
4-Aug-89 1207 21 21 21 21,9 21,9 21
4-Sep-89 1209 20.5 20.5 20.5 20.5,13 20.5,13 20.5
5-Oct-89 1209 20 20 20 20,17 20,17 20
5-Nov-89 1209 20 20 20 20,20 20,20 20
26-Mar-90 1233 21 21 21 21,21 21,21 21
15-Nov-90 1261 22 22 22 22 22 22
30-Nov-90 1261 23 23 23 23 23 23
28-Dec-90 1269 25 25 25 25 25 25
29-Jan-93 1377 24 24 24 24 24 24
30-Apr-93 1377 23 23 23 23 23 23
30-Jul-93 1377 22 22 22 22 22 22
31-Dec-93 10 22 20 20 20 20 20 2
15-Aug-94 38 19 17 17 17 17 17 2
31-May-95 73 17 15 15 15 15 15 2
3-Jan-97 119 16 14 14 14 14 14 2
4-Jul-97 119 15 13 13 13 13 13 2
31-Jul-97 136 17 13 13 13 13 13 4
15-Aug-97 139 18 13 13 13 13 13 5
29-Aug-97 140 21 13 13 13 13 13 8
5-Sep-97 141 20 13 13 13 13 13 7
19-Sep-97 141 19 13 13 13 13 13 6
15-Oct-97 144 18 13 13 13 13 13 5
15-Nov-97 144 17 13 13 13 13 13 4
20-Mar-98 158 17 10 10 10 10 10 7
29-May-98 166 15 8 8 8 8   8 7
2-Oct-98 180 17 10 10 10 10 10 7
1-Feb-99 188 16 10 10 10 10 10 6
1-Mar-99 188 15 10 10 10 10 10 5
16-Apr-99 197 14 10 10 10 10 10 4
2-Jul-99 205 12 9 9 9 9 9 3
1/ Includes regular and liquidity reserves
2/ These rates apply to those with maturites of:  730 days or less and more than 730 days, respectively. Starting 15 November 1990, which is the
effectivity date of
     Circular No. 1261, a uniform rate was prescribed regardless of maturities.
3/ Refers to the portion which are allowed to be held in the form of market-yielding government securitites purchased directly from the BSP. Prior to 31
May 1995,
     this formed part of the regular reserves.  After that date, it was added on to the regular reserves and was later referred to in later circulars as liquidity
reserves.
Source:  BSP-Department of Economic Research
TABLE 3
PHILIPPINES:  SELECTED  ECONOMIC  INDICATORS, 1986-Latest 1999
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
I.  MACROECONOMIC OBJECTIVES
A.  Real GNP (Average, %) 4.2 4.6 7.7 5.9 4.5 0.5 1.6 2.1 5.3 4.9 7.2 5.2 0.1 2.0 Jan-Mar
B.  CPI, Average, Year-on-Year (1994=100) -0.4 3.0 12.2 11.5 13.2 18.5 8.6 7.0 8.3 8.0 9.1 5.9 9.7 8.0 Jan-Jul
C.  Balance of Payments Overall Position             p/
          (Deficit(-)/Surplus(+) 1242 264 593 451 -93 2103 1492 -166 1802 631 4107 -3363 1359 2756 Jan-May
       of which:  Current Account(Deficit(-)/
      Surplus(+) 954 -444 -390 -1456 -2567 -869 -858 -3016 -2950 -3297 -3953 -4351 1287 1324 Jan-Mar
of which:
    Real export growth 5.0 15.1 11.5 -0.9 -8.5 -10.5 2.5 8.8 10.2 21.4 8.6 16.9 7.2 2.6 Jan-Apr
II.  POLICY VARIABLES
A.  Monetary Aggregates            p/
       M3, Nominal Year-on-Year Growth, % 7.6 12.1 22.6 28.0 18.4 15.5 11.0 24.6 26.5 25.3 15.8 21.0 7.4 7.0 Jan-Apr
       M3,  Real Year-on-Year Growth, % 8.0 9.1 10.4 16.5 5.2 -3.0 2.4 17.6 18.2 17.3 6.7 15.1 -2.3 -2.5 Jan-Apr
       M3/Nominal GNP Ratio 24.2 24.1 25.1 27.8 28.1 27.7 28.0 32.0 35.0 38.9 38.6 41.6 41.0 39.4 Jan-Mar
       Net Domestic Assets, MS/Nominal GNP 49.3 45.3 41.2 41.1 45.6 37.6 31.5 36.8 39.7 46.3 52.4 65.7 60.2 54.3 Jan-Mar
       Base Money, Nominal Year-on-Year            p/
     Growth, %     19.8 11.0 15.1 35.7 26.3 14.3 9.2 14.5 11.5 17.0 14.3 16.1 3.9 -5.3 Jan-Apr
       Reserve Money, Nominal Year-on-        p/
     Year Growth, % 32.7 13.1 16.5 38.0 17.1 19.0 12.0 18.6 6.2 16.6 14.4 9.5 -10.0 8.9 Jan-Apr
       Net Domestic Credit from the Monetary 
 System, Year-on-Year Growth, % -13.7 -9.1 7.1 22.4 31.2 0.6 3.0 146.1 20.5 31.9 39.1 27.5 -2.8 -6.0 Jan-Apr
       Base Money Multiplier  1/ 2.568 2.593 2.763 2.607 2.443 2.469 2.509 2.732 3.098 3.319 3.363 3.503 3.620 4.053 Jan-Apr
B.  Overall NG Budget Surplus/Deficit(-)
(In Billion Pesos) -31.3 -16.7 -23.2 -19.6 -37.2 -26.3 -16.0 -21.9 16.3 11.1 6.3 1.6 -50.0 -45.3 Jan-May       
        (As Percent of Nominal GNP) -5.1 -2.5 -2.9 -2.2 -3.5 -2.1 -1.2 -1.5 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.1 -1.8 ….
C.   External Debt (In Million US$) 28.3 28.6 27.9 27.6 30.0 31.4 32.1 35.5 38.7 39.4 41.9 45.4 47.8 ….
D.   91-day Treasury Bill Rate (Ave., %)
In Nominal Terms 14.4 11.4 14.4 19.3 23.4 21.4 16.1 12.3 13.7 11.3 12.4 13.1 15.3 11.9 Jan-May
          a/
In Real Terms 14.8 8.4 2.2 7.8 10.2 2.9 7.5 5.3 5.4 3.3 3.3 7.2 5.6 5.2 Jan-May
E.   Average Peso-Dollar Rate
       Average Peso-Dollar Rate 20.39 20.57 21.10 21.74 24.31 27.48 25.51 27.12 26.42 25.71 26.22 29.47 40.89 38.44 Jan-May
(Rate of Appreciation(+)/
            Depreciation(-)) -8.7 -0.9 -2.5 -3.0 -10.6 -11.5 7.7 -5.9 2.7 2.7 -1.9 -11.0 -27.9 4.0   
       Real Effective Exchange Rate  3/        e/        e/
  (Index at 1980=100) 71.45 67.11 66.04 70.71 69.20 68.18 76.37 74.65 79.57 84.30 91.54 88.49 71.27 75.70 Jan-May
 
1/  Derived as M3/Base Money
2/  REER OF Major Trading Partners.
p/  Preliminary
….  Data not available.
a/  Inflation rate for the month of May 1999 was 6.7 percent.
e/  Estimate.
             
TABLE 4
LOANS OUTSTANDING OF COMMERCIAL BANKS 1/
1990-May 1999
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Dec Dec Dec Dec Dec Dec Dec Dec Dec May
A.  Classified by Economic Activity
(In Million Pesos)
       1.  Agriculture, Fisheries & Forestry 26919.7 35159.0 38700.0 46091.6 49845.0 59603.0 63433.9 70705.2 62930.1 61917.2
       2.  Mining and Quarrying 6224.7 5568.5 6862.1 10767.3 5585.6 8710.6 9529.3 16231.3 20047.7 16729.5
       3.  Manufacturing 92515.7 89712.2 112702.4 142985.3 189457.5 253638.9 361555.9 424255.4 357455.0 339269.9
       4.  Electricity, Gas & Water 3168.5 3505.7 4046.8 10501.9 13199.4 16460.3 31368.9 42023.8 47284.0 47943.6
       5.  Construction 6394.1 6953.5 8239.3 13619.7 18019.8 24759.8 43132.1 51589.7 54972.2 55603.9
       6.  Wholesale & Retail Trade 34764.6 44377.5 53224.1 67994.0 95089.6 130568.1 180281.4 230765.0 210190.5 189567.4
       7.  Transportation, Storage & Communication 9029.5 9077.1 11063.3 16899.7 25988.4 44708.0 68556.7 101252.9 98636.0 97155.4
       8.  Fin. Inst., Real Estate & Bus. Services 40495.2 48267.3 65694.2 72307.5 99333.7 123943.9 244422.1 348476.6 347339.3 344915.1
       9.  Community, Social & Personal Services 20743.1 21453.5 26897.3 51662.4 46277.0 74867.8 117984.2 131485.0 149336.2 145063.9
TOTAL  240255.1 264074.3 327429.5 432829.4 542796.0 737260.4 1120264.5 1416784.9 1348191.0 1298165.9
B.  Year-on-Year Growth Rate (%)
       1.  Agriculture, Fisheries & Forestry 30.6 10.1 19.1 8.1 19.6 6.4 11.5 -11.0 -2.8
       2.  Mining and Quarrying -10.5 23.2 56.9 -48.1 55.9 9.4 70.3 23.5 0.0
       3.  Manufacturing -3.0 25.6 26.9 32.5 33.9 42.5 17.3 -15.7 -16.6
       4.  Electricity, Gas & Water 10.6 15.4 159.5 25.7 24.7 90.6 34.0 12.5 4.7
       5.  Construction 8.7 18.5 65.3 32.3 37.4 74.2 19.6 6.6 4.3
       6.  Wholesale & Retail Trade 27.7 19.9 27.8 39.8 37.3 38.1 28.0 -8.9 -6.5
       7.  Transportation, Storage & Communication 0.5 21.9 52.8 53.8 72.0 53.3 47.7 -2.6 -2.2
       8.  Fin. Inst., Real Estate & Bus. Services 19.2 36.1 10.1 37.4 24.8 97.2 42.6 -0.3 -4.4
       9.  Community, Social & Personal Services 3.4 25.4 92.1 -10.4 61.8 57.6 11.4 13.6 15.2
TOTAL 9.9 24.0 32.2 25.4 35.8 51.9 26.5 -4.8 -5.6
C.  Per Cent Share (%)
       1.  Agriculture, Fisheries & Forestry 11.2 13.3 11.8 10.6 9.2 8.1 5.7 5.0 4.7 4.8
       2.  Mining and Quarrying 2.6 2.1 2.1 2.5 1.0 1.2 0.9 1.1 1.5 1.3
       3.  Manufacturing 38.5 34.0 34.4 33.0 34.9 34.4 32.3 29.9 26.5 26.1
       4.  Electricity, Gas & Water 1.3 1.3 1.2 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.8 3.0 3.5 3.7
       5.  Construction 2.7 2.6 2.5 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.9 3.6 4.1 4.3
       6.  Wholesale & Retail Trade 14.5 16.8 16.3 15.7 17.5 17.7 16.1 16.3 15.6 14.6
       7.  Transportation, Storage & Communication 3.8 3.4 3.4 3.9 4.8 6.1 6.1 7.1 7.3 7.5
       8.  Fin. Inst., Real Estate & Bus. Services 16.9 18.3 20.1 16.7 18.3 16.8 21.8 24.6 25.8 26.6
       9.  Community, Social & Personal Services 8.6 8.1 8.2 11.9 8.5 10.2 10.5 9.3 11.1 11.2
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1/  Peso and Foreign Accounts but excluding transactions of local banks' foreign offices.
 Source:  BSP-Department of Economic Research
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MCI, REER AND LENDING RATE 
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BASE MONEY OVERPERFORMANCE(-)/UNDERPERFORMANCE(+) WITH PROGRAM TARGETS 
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higher than program.  No program targets were agreed upon during the period January to May 1995.
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Figure 1
   A FRAMEWORK FOR CONDUCT OF MONETARY POLICY
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Figure 3
MONETARY PROGRAMMING IN THE PHILIPPINES
Figure 4a
SCATTER DIAGRAM:  M3GROWTH VS CPIGROWTH
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Figure 4b
SCATTER DIAGRAM:  M3GROWTH VS CPIGROWTH
January 1986-December 1993
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Figure 4c
SCATTER DIAGRAM:  M3GROWTH VS CPIGROWTH
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 Source:  Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas-Department of Economic Research
  
 
Figure 5
A FLOW DIAGRAM OF MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES
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SCATTER DIAGRAM:  MCI VS OUTPUT GAP
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Figure 7
MONTHLY EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES AND BSP NET INTERVENTION
October 1995 – August 1997
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
TABLE 1a
AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER TESTS:  SUMMARY
                Critical Value
Variables  Results 5% 10%
    GDP
       Level -1.691 -2.938 -2.607
       First Difference -6.766 -2.940 -2.608
    REERMAJOR
       Level -2.282 -2.938 -2.607
       First Difference -4.181 -2.940 -2.608
    BANK
       Level -4.341 -2.938 -2.607
       First Difference -4.822 -2.940 -2.608
    GOV
       Level -1.406 -2.938 -2.607
       First Difference -6.722 -2.940 -2.608
    USGDP
       Level -2.822 -2.938 -2.607
       First Difference -3.365 -2.940 -2.608
    GDRESID
       Level -8.414 -2.967 -2.622
       First Difference -9.391 -2.971 -2.624
Table 1b
ADF Test Results: GDP
A. Levels
ADF Test Statistic -1.691151 1%   Critical Value* -3.6067
5%   Critical Value -2.9378
10% Critical Value -2.6069
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(GDP)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 10/08/99   Time: 17:55
Sample(adjusted): 1989:3 1999:1
Included observations: 39 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
GDP(-1) -0.240266 0.142072 -1.691151 0.0994
D(GDP(-1)) -0.461932 0.153892 -3.001672 0.0049
C 49130.75 27758.19 1.769955 0.0852
R-squared 0.384071 Mean dependent var 1209.026
Adjusted R-squared 0.349853 S.D. dependent var 20723.82
S.E. of regression 16709.97 Akaike info criterion 22.35920
Sum squared resid 1.01E+10 Schwarz criterion 22.48717
Log likelihood -433.0044 F-statistic 11.22416
Durbin-Watson stat 2.165443 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000163
B. First Differences
ADF Test Statistic -6.765863     1%   Critical Value* -3.6117
    5%   Critical Value -2.9399
    10% Critical Value -2.6080
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(GDP,2)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 10/08/99   Time: 17:56
Sample(adjusted): 1989:4 1999:1
Included observations: 38 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(GDP(-1)) -1.989003 0.293976 -6.765863 0.0000
D(GDP(-1),2) 0.256319 0.167677 1.528644 0.1353
C 3064.150 2808.283 1.091112 0.2827
R-squared 0.798166     Mean dependent var -584.8947
Adjusted R-squared 0.786632     S.D. dependent var 36904.61
S.E. of regression 17046.88     Akaike info criterion 22.40098
Sum squared resid 1.02E+10     Schwarz criterion 22.53026
Log likelihood -422.6186     F-statistic 69.20483
Durbin-Watson stat 2.347731     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Table 1c
ADF Test Results: REERMAJOR
A. Levels
ADF Test Statistic -2.281727     1%   Critical Value* -3.6067
    5%   Critical Value -2.9378
    10% Critical Value -2.6069
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(REERMAJOR)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 10/08/99   Time: 18:03
Sample(adjusted): 1989:3 1999:1
Included observations: 39 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
REERMAJOR(-1) -0.159796 0.070033 -2.281727 0.0285
D(REERMAJOR(-1)) 0.424134 0.153401 2.764874 0.0089
C 12.50207 5.459224 2.290082 0.0280
R-squared 0.227290     Mean dependent var 0.135974
Adjusted R-squared 0.184362     S.D. dependent var 4.214224
S.E. of regression 3.805979     Akaike info criterion 5.584827
Sum squared resid 521.4770     Schwarz criterion 5.712793
Log likelihood -105.9041     F-statistic 5.294647
Durbin-Watson stat 1.870785     Prob(F-statistic) 0.009645
B. First Difference
ADF Test Statistic -4.181383     1%   Critical Value* -3.6117
    5%   Critical Value -2.9399
    10% Critical Value -2.6080
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(REERMAJOR,2)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 10/08/99   Time: 18:04
Sample(adjusted): 1989:4 1999:1
Included observations: 38 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(REERMAJOR(-1)) -0.808317 0.193313 -4.181383 0.0002
D(REERMAJOR(-1),2) 0.229232 0.167999 1.364485 0.1811
C 0.086170 0.651502 0.132264 0.8955
R-squared 0.352882     Mean dependent var 0.089474
Adjusted R-squared 0.315904     S.D. dependent var 4.855641
S.E. of regression 4.016107     Akaike info criterion 5.694160
Sum squared resid 564.5190     Schwarz criterion 5.823443
Log likelihood -105.1890     F-statistic 9.542969
Durbin-Watson stat 1.972771     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000492
Table 1d
ADF Test Results: BANK
A.        Levels
ADF Test Statistic -4.341378     1%   Critical Value* -3.6067
    5%   Critical Value -2.9378
    10% Critical Value -2.6069
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(BANK)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 10/08/99   Time: 17:59
Sample(adjusted): 1989:3 1999:1
Included observations: 39 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
BANK(-1) -0.545887 0.125741 -4.341378 0.0001
D(BANK(-1)) 0.533793 0.147368 3.622189 0.0009
C 4.268322 1.047876 4.073307 0.0002
R-squared 0.381746     Mean dependent var -0.096667
Adjusted R-squared 0.347399     S.D. dependent var 2.427648
S.E. of regression 1.961145     Akaike info criterion 4.258737
Sum squared resid 138.4592     Schwarz criterion 4.386703
Log likelihood -80.04537     F-statistic 11.11427
Durbin-Watson stat 2.133187     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000174
B.        First Difference
ADF Test Statistic -4.822364     1%   Critical Value* -3.6117
    5%   Critical Value -2.9399
    10% Critical Value -2.6080
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(BANK,2)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 10/08/99   Time: 18:00
Sample(adjusted): 1989:4 1999:1
Included observations: 38 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(BANK(-1)) -0.966380 0.200395 -4.822364 0.0000
D(BANK(-1),2) 0.272069 0.162814 1.671043 0.1036
C -0.073007 0.383403 -0.190418 0.8501
R-squared 0.426168     Mean dependent var 0.016316
Adjusted R-squared 0.393377     S.D. dependent var 3.031167
S.E. of regression 2.360854     Akaike info criterion 4.631581
Sum squared resid 195.0771     Schwarz criterion 4.760864
Log likelihood -85.00003     F-statistic 12.99672
Durbin-Watson stat 2.130239     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000060
Table 1e
ADF Test Results: GOV
A. Levels
ADF Test Statistic -1.406453     1%   Critical Value* -3.6067
    5%   Critical Value -2.9378
    10% Critical Value -2.6069
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(GOV)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 10/08/99   Time: 18:05
Sample(adjusted): 1989:3 1999:1
Included observations: 39 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
GOV(-1) -0.089911 0.063927 -1.406453 0.1682
D(GOV(-1)) -0.140205 0.162305 -0.863837 0.3934
C 1548.238 996.5538 1.553592 0.1290
R-squared 0.079940     Mean dependent var 134.2308
Adjusted R-squared 0.028826     S.D. dependent var 651.2851
S.E. of regression 641.8296     Akaike info criterion 15.84033
Sum squared resid 14830028     Schwarz criterion 15.96829
Log likelihood -305.8864     F-statistic 1.563944
Durbin-Watson stat 2.048421     Prob(F-statistic) 0.223198
B.        First Difference
ADF Test Statistic -6.722318 1%   Critical Value* -3.6117
5%   Critical Value -2.9399
10% Critical Value -2.6080
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(GOV,2)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 10/08/99   Time: 18:06
Sample(adjusted): 1989:4 1999:1
Included observations: 38 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(GOV(-1)) -1.597324 0.237615 -6.722318 0.0000
D(GOV(-1),2) 0.375527 0.157190 2.389005 0.0224
C 194.2030 103.8411 1.870193 0.0698
R-squared 0.643736 Mean dependent var -5.394737
Adjusted R-squared 0.623378 S.D. dependent var 997.2545
S.E. of regression 612.0101 Akaike info criterion 15.74703
Sum squared resid 13109473 Schwarz criterion 15.87631
Log likelihood -296.1936 F-statistic 31.62092
Durbin-Watson stat 2.327677 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Table 1f
ADF Test Results: USGDP
A. Levels
ADF Test Statistic  2.822141     1%   Critical Value* -3.6067
    5%   Critical Value -2.9378
    10% Critical Value -2.6069
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(USGDP)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 10/08/99   Time: 19:53
Sample(adjusted): 1989:3 1999:1
Included observations: 39 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
USGDP(-1) 0.016897 0.005987 2.822141 0.0077
D(USGDP(-1)) 0.015079 0.166999 0.090294 0.9286
C -30.40314 37.42522 -0.812370 0.4219
R-squared 0.221283     Mean dependent var 87.06667
Adjusted R-squared 0.178021     S.D. dependent var 35.81667
S.E. of regression 32.47248     Akaike info criterion 9.872466
Sum squared resid 37960.63     Schwarz criterion 10.00043
Log likelihood -189.5131     F-statistic 5.114956
Durbin-Watson stat 2.011357     Prob(F-statistic) 0.011087
B. First Differences
ADF Test Statistic -3.365158 1%   Critical Value* -3.6117
5%   Critical Value -2.9399
10% Critical Value -2.6080
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(USGDP,2)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 10/08/99   Time: 19:53
Sample(adjusted): 1989:4 1999:1
Included observations: 38 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(USGDP(-1)) -0.745552 0.221550 -3.365158 0.0019
D(USGDP(-1),2) -0.031562 0.176214 -0.179114 0.8589
C 65.57433 19.80594 3.310841 0.0022
R-squared 0.378584 Mean dependent var 1.415789
Adjusted R-squared 0.343074 S.D. dependent var 44.76095
S.E. of regression 36.27918 Akaike info criterion 10.09602
Sum squared resid 46066.26 Schwarz criterion 10.22530
Log likelihood -188.8244 F-statistic 10.66147
Durbin-Watson stat 1.997432 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000242
Table 1g
ADF Test Results: GDPRESID
A. Levels
ADF Test Statistic -8.413613 1%   Critical Value* -3.6752
5%   Critical Value -2.9665
10% Critical Value -2.6220
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(GDPRESID)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 10/08/99   Time: 18:12
Sample(adjusted): 1992:1 1999:1
Included observations: 29 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
GDPRESID(-1) -1.713935 0.203710 -8.413613 0.0000
D(GDPRESID(-1)) 0.544959 0.139612 3.903375 0.0006
C -0.006323 0.008441 -0.749033 0.4606
R-squared 0.754704 Mean dependent var -0.004037
Adjusted R-squared 0.735836 S.D. dependent var 0.088308
S.E. of regression 0.045388 Akaike info criterion -3.249453
Sum squared resid 0.053561 Schwarz criterion -3.108009
Log likelihood 50.11707 F-statistic 39.99730
Durbin-Watson stat 1.779321 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
B. First Difference
ADF Test Statistic -9.391397     1%   Critical Value* -3.6852
    5%   Critical Value -2.9705
    10% Critical Value -2.6242
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(GDPRESID,2)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 10/08/99   Time: 18:14
Sample(adjusted): 1992:2 1999:1
Included observations: 28 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(GDPRESID(-1)) -1.959941 0.208695 -9.391397 0.0000
D(GDPRESID(-1),2) 0.554759 0.131221 4.227683 0.0003
C 0.001261 0.010947 0.115201 0.9092
R-squared 0.826369     Mean dependent var 0.010717
Adjusted R-squared 0.812478     S.D. dependent var 0.133339
S.E. of regression 0.057741     Akaike info criterion -2.764740
Sum squared resid 0.083351     Schwarz criterion -2.622003
Log likelihood 41.70636     F-statistic 59.49160
Durbin-Watson stat 2.724181     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
TABLE 2a
THE ESTIMATION RESULTS
Model A 1/ Model B 2/ Model C 3/
DLNGDP DLNGDP DLNGDP
A.  Variables
Constant 0.007 -0.029 0.004
 DREERMAJOR(-8) -0.588 -0.586 -0.521 (-8)
 DLNBANK(-9) -0.065 -0.062 0.033 (-8)
DLNGOV(-6) 1.411 1.309 1.273
DLNUSGDP 2.899
DLNGDP(-3) -0.425 -0.442 -0.407
B.  Diagnostic Tests
R2 (Adjusted) 0.585 0.592 0.487
Durbin Watson 2.024 2.092 2.177
Durbin Watson h -0.115 -0.439 -1.113
F-Statistics 11.569 9.722 8.345
C. MCI Ratio:
(reermajor/bank) 9.046 9.386 -15.641
Wreermajor 0.900 0.904  1.068
Wbank 0.100 0.096  -0.068
1/  Excludes USGDP as indicator of foreign economic activity.
2/  Includes USGDP as indicator of foreign economic activity.
3/   REERMAJOR and BANK are assumed to have the same lag effects
   on real GDP.
Table 2b
Summary of Results:  Model A
Dependent Variable: DLNGDP
Method: Least Squares
Date: 10/08/99   Time: 17:51
Sample(adjusted): 1991:3 1999:1
Included observations: 31 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.006943 0.012261 0.566306 0.5760
DREERMAJOR(-8) -0.587587 0.285655 -2.056983 0.0498
DLNBANK(-9) -0.065467 0.029788 -2.197769 0.0371
DLNGOV(-6) 1.411475 0.382454 3.690576 0.0010
DLNGDP(-3) -0.424538 0.116294 -3.650558 0.0012
R-squared 0.640265 Mean dependent var 0.007213
Adjusted R-squared 0.584921 S.D. dependent var 0.100373
S.E. of regression 0.064667 Akaike info criterion -
2.492443
Sum squared resid 0.108727 Schwarz criterion -
2.261155
Log likelihood 43.63287 F-statistic 11.56885
Durbin-Watson stat 2.023667 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000016
Table 2c
Summary of  Results:  Model B
Dependent Variable: DLNGDP
Method: Least Squares
Date: 10/08/99   Time: 19:47
Sample(adjusted): 1991:3 1999:1
Included observations: 31 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.028662 0.031685 -0.904587 0.3743
DREERMAJOR(-8) -0.585725 0.283056 -2.069292 0.0490
DLNBANK(-9) -0.062407 0.029623 -2.106676 0.0454
DLNGOV(-6) 1.309459 0.388133 3.373737 0.0024
DLNUSGDP(-6) 2.899009 2.382663 1.216709 0.2351
DLNGDP(-3) -0.441633 0.116088 -3.804304 0.0008
R-squared 0.660376 Mean dependent var 0.007213
Adjusted R-squared 0.592451 S.D. dependent var 0.100373
S.E. of regression 0.064078 Akaike info criterion -
2.485456
Sum squared resid 0.102649 Schwarz criterion -
2.207910
Log likelihood 44.52456 F-statistic 9.722159
Durbin-Watson stat 2.091761 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000030
Table 2d
Summary of  Results:  Model C
Dependent Variable: DLNGDP
Method: Least Squares
Date: 10/08/99   Time: 18:23
Sample(adjusted): 1991:2 1999:1
Included observations: 32 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.003872 0.013597 0.284772 0.7780
DREERMAJOR(-8) -0.521327 0.321159 -1.623267 0.1162
DLNBANK(-8) 0.033307 0.036932 0.901843 0.3751
DLNGOV(-6) 1.273356 0.394489 3.227863 0.0033
DLNGDP(-3) -0.407258 0.134429 -3.029536 0.0053
R-squared 0.552830     Mean dependent var 0.007453
Adjusted R-squared 0.486582     S.D. dependent var 0.098750
S.E. of regression 0.070758     Akaike info criterion -
2.316511
Sum squared resid 0.135179     Schwarz criterion -
2.087490
Log likelihood 42.06418     F-statistic 8.344917
Durbin-Watson stat 2.177165     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000162
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